Principle 3: Effective Investigation b. External Mechanisms for Accountability Effective accountability “involves many different actors representing the different layers of modern-day democracies.”390 Specifically, institutions that oversee the work of investigative bodies may include the legislature, through initiatives of its members or specific commissions for inquiry; the judiciary, through criminal or civil review of specific cases; “as well as human rights commissions, civilian complaint review boards or independent ombudspersons.”391 Another source of external oversight may be a professional organization that oversees the behavior of its members and issues sanctions for malpractice. In the United States, for example, the American Bar Association establishes the standards for the professional conduct of attorneys. Oversight from these institutions can help ensure impartial and effective investigation in the electoral context.392 There are several practical reasons to encourage external oversight of investigative bodies. External oversight can foster an impartial and independent review of serious allegations against investigators, officials, or staff, and identify and address conflicts of interest. Furthermore, the appearance of impartiality inspires confidence in these oversight institutions, thereby encouraging the public’s use of complaints mechanisms. External oversight may encourage investigators and staff to report the misconduct or malpractice of others within the investigative body, particularly supervisors or overall mismanagement.393 The degree to which oversight institutions are involved in reviewing an investigative body’s operations or investigator conduct varies considerably across country contexts. As the OSCE notes: “While some oversight organizations take responsibility for receiving and investigating complaints – sometimes only in cases of serious misconduct or if internal investigations appear faulty – others are limited to overseeing and reviewing investigations carried out by the…agencies themselves.”394 Legislatures often institute anti-corruption measures for making public agencies—including adjudicative and investigative bodies—more directly 390 U.N. Handbook on Police Accountability, Oversight, and Integrity, supra note 343, at iv. 391 OSCE Guidebook for Democratic Policing, supra note 336, ¶ 84. 392 Merloe, supra note 92, at 33. 393 Cf. OSCE Guidebook for Democratic Policing, supra note 336, ¶ 86. 394 Id. ¶ 85. 115