Election Investigations Guidebook that are found within this framework are often impossible to reconcile with compressed electoral timeframes;2 2| A specific electoral framework is adopted (rather than using a civil procedure), which sets out rudimentary due process guarantees—such as the right to a hearing or the right to submit written answers—but which lacks rules on the admissibility of evidence and/or the burden and/or standard of proof;3 or 3| Both courts and electoral management bodies (EMBs) must follow the legislation on administrative procedures.4 Another common problem encountered in the field relates to the fact that legal frameworks often mandate EMBs to investigate violations, although many are neither trained nor appropriately staffed to conduct professional investigations. Often, EMBs only involve law enforcement—which would be best equipped to conduct these investigations—if the alleged conduct is criminal rather than administrative, even if the alleged maladministration had or could have had an impact on the election outcome. If criminal conduct is alleged and a law enforcement body initiates a criminal investigation, the due process guarantees and the high required evidence standards (beyond a reasonable doubt) can thwart a timely outcome and limit the ability of election dispute resolution bodies to take criminal convictions into account when determining remedies. Some frameworks that vest EMBs with this mandate stop short of endowing them with the requisite judicial powers to effectively conduct investigations, such as the powers to subpoena documents and witnesses and to hold non-compliant parties in contempt. Such framework incoherence exposes EMBs to unjustified criticism that they abdicate their investigative mandates. An example of an EMB that is vested with a fairly complete array of investiga- 2 Compare Libyan Elect. L. art. 29, No. 10/2014 (imposing 48–72 hour timeframes) with Libyan Civ. Code art. 752–53 (granting ample time for cross-motion and adjournment windows). 3 For instance, most Francophone African electoral frameworks; see, e.g., Code électoral [Electoral Code], Feb. 7, 1992, No. 2012-01 (Sen.); Republique de Cote D’Ivoire, Compliation de lois Portant Composition, Organisation, Attributions et Fonctionnement de la Commission Electorale Independante (CEI) (2004); Const. art. 49, 81 (Benin); Const. art. 104 (Togo); Const. art. 116 (Madag.). 4 16 This applies in most post-Soviet states.