Principle 2: Thorough Investigation summarizes the various types of evidence that investigators can consider.115 It is worth noting that it is common for EMBs and other investigative bodies to refer to the civil code of procedures or rules on evidence from the judiciary instead of designing their own. This practice can create additional hurdles for investigators because the formalities of evidence might not be appropriate for an election adjudication process, where timeliness is a more pressing concern. In Myanmar, Election Tribunals (temporary bodies established to adjudicate post-election petitions against the results) follow the code of civil procedure.116 During its post-election review, the Union Election Commission and Tribunal members expressed a desire to develop special procedures distinct from the Code of Civil Procedure. Although pre-determined rules of evidence ought to be applied and to provide guidance to investigators, it is impossible to list every type of evidence that could come up in every situation. Hence, adjudicators must have some flexibility to gather and consider any evidence that brings clarity to the question at hand. In Kenya, the Political Parties Disputes Tribunal (PPDT) developed rules of procedure, noting that the tribunal was “not bound by technicalities or legal rules of procedure and may waive any rules or procedural requirements.”117 Substantiating and Corroborating Evidence In the high-pressure political atmosphere that surrounds election periods, particularly when an overwhelming narrative of fraud dominates public discourse, investigators cannot overlook the need for a thorough investigation that substantiates the claims of fraud or malpractice alleged against election officials or other electoral stakeholders. In the 2010 Afghanistan presidential election, for instance, many tally forms submitted to the Independent Election Commission (IEC) and Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) contained both administrative errors and evidence of fraud. Several of these tally forms met investigatory triggers118 and fell into 115 See Law of Ukraine on Election of the People’s Deputies of Ukraine, No. 4061-VI, art. 112(1) (2011) (unofficial IFES translation). 116 Pyithu Hluttaw Election Law ch. 15 (2010) (Myanmar); Myanmar Const. ch. IX (2008). 117 Kenya Political Parties Disputes Tribunal Rules of Procedure § 40 (2017). 118 See Eur. Union Election Assessment Team, Final Report: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Parliamentary Elections, September 18, 2010, 24 (2011) (triggers included the total number of votes [valid + invalid] that exceeded or equaled 600; more than 90 percent of valid and invalid votes were cast for one candidate [against the total of invalid and valid votes]; or there were inconsistencies greater than 4 percentage points between the total number of ballot papers withdrawn from the ballot box and the total number of valid and invalid votes). 57