Principle 4: independent and Impartial Investigators training and professional development, adequate vacation leave, as well as health and life insurance benefits. To further guard against the application of political pressure during an electoral investigation—regardless of whether or not an investigative body is permanent—states should provide for investigators’ job security, at least during the course of the institution’s existence, as a guarantee of their independence and commitment.521 Similar guarantees are emphasized in international guidelines on the role of judges522—judges who investigate complaints as part of their duties should, accordingly, have security of position. While considerations for the security of tenure are different for investigators who also hold other positions, such as election officials or staff members, there should be institutional guarantees for continued employment during an election process, barring reasonable causes for dismissal. Eliminating Opportunities for Corruption One approach to reducing opportunities for corruption within an investigation body is to remove specific types of investigative decisions from the authority of investigators.523 The American Bar Association’s Standards for Prosecutorial Investigation support this measure, noting that “generally, the prosecutor engaged in an investigation should not be the sole decision-maker” for determinations that are material to the investigation.524 In Bhutan, for example, members of an Investigation Committee cannot participate in the decision-making process of the Central Election Dispute Settlement Body (CEDSB).525 Likewise, the Elections Canada Commissioner makes final decisions after reviewing the investigation report submitted by Special Investigators.526 In Afghanistan, the 2014 complaints adjudication procedure clearly delineated between the legal team and investigators, on the one hand, and the arbiters, on the other.527 Internal and external reporting mechanisms also help prevent corruption 521 See Orozco-Henríquez et al., supra note 101, at 107. 522 Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, supra note 112. 523 Cf. OSCE Guidebook for Democratic Policing, supra note 336, ¶ 28 . 524 American Bar Association Standards for Prosecutorial Investigations, supra note 82, § 1.2(c). 525 Bhutan Election Dispute Settlement Rules and Regulations, supra note 28, ¶ 11.3. 526 Comm’r of Canada Elections, Ch. 14 Assessment of Investigation Findings, in Investigators’ Manual, Appendices 1 (2000). 527 Afghanistan, Election complaints Commission, Procedure on Adjudication of complaints and objections art. 24.3. 141