Introduction tive powers is Senegal’s Autonomous National Electoral Commission (CENA), whose statute arms it with civil remedies, such as injunction, substitution, and order for specific performance. The extent to which legal frameworks are prescriptive about what investigation procedures are to be followed varies widely, including cases in which alleged conduct is both criminal and potentially outcome-determinative. For example, Armenia’s election code minutely prescribes the steps to be taken to investigate impostor voting, including the process for a joint EMB-police investigation.5 Given this range of challenges, IFES conducted an initial literature review of available texts on investigations and found scant comparative documentation on election investigations. This finding underpinned IFES’ initiative to produce a user-friendly publication for practitioners (including development assistance providers, prosecutors, members of the judicial system, and election commissions). Bhutan and Canada are specifically cited throughout this volume because they represent two of the very few countries that have put in place guidelines and procedures specific to election investigations. IFES engaged with a number of relevant experts in creating this Guidebook, including prosecutors from the United States Department of Justice and the Special Prosecutor for Electoral Crimes in the Office of the Attorney General of Mexico. In addition, IFES staff held meetings with judges and lawyers who 5 Council, European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), CDL-REF(2018)054, Armenia: Electoral Code art. 48(17) (May 4, 2018) (“When examining applications regarding voting instead of a person being absent from the Republic of Armenia, the district electoral commission shall: 1) verify — through Electronic Border Management Information System (hereinafter referred to as “EBMIS”) used by Border Guard Troops of the National Security Service of the Republic of Armenia adjunct to the Government of the Republic of Armenia — information on the fact of being absent from the Republic of Armenia of the person referred to in the application. Where the data available in the EBMIS reveal that the person, with regard to whom the application has been submitted, has crossed the border of the Republic of Armenia after the start of the voting, the application for this person shall be deemed groundless, and the administrative proceedings with respect to that part shall be dismissed. Where the data available in the EBMIS reveal that the person, with regard to whom the application has been submitted, has not crossed the border of the Republic of Armenia or has last crossed the border when entering the territory of the Republic of Armenia, the application for this person shall be deemed groundless, and the administrative proceedings with respect to that part shall be dismissed; (2) establish whether the person, with regard to whom the application has been submitted, has been registered by means of technical equipment; (3) verify also, in case of an elector registered by means of technical equipment and having an identification card, whether the fingerprint provided in the course of registration matches the fingerprint of that elector available in the electronic database of identification cards maintained by the Police. Upon the request of the district electoral commission, the Police, the National Security Service and, where necessary, other bodies may be engaged in the process of organising examination of applications regarding voting instead of another person. Where there is no sufficient evidence proving the participation in the voting by the given person, solely for rendering a decision based on the election results, it shall be deemed, applying the principle of presumption of reliability, that voting instead of another person has taken place. All the applications shall also be forwarded to the relevant law enforcement body, regardless of the process of examination of the application in the district electoral commission.“). 17