Principle 1: Prompt Investigation ceedings “should be as brief as possible.”96 Similarly, the Inter-Parliamentary Union Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Elections stipulates that “[s] tates should ensure that violations of human rights and complaints relating to the electoral process are determined promptly within the time frame of the electoral process….”97 Finally, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) also stresses that “election complaints should be subject to an expedited process of consideration that permits them to be resolved in a timely and effective manner.”98 Considering the general importance of the timely resolution of election contests, this principle also applies to (and constrains) the investigative process. From a rights-based approach, some argue that the timeliness of the response is central to the voter’s “essential freedom to choose.”99 The core principle at stake concerns the state’s interest in “speedy resolution of potentially divisive issues.”100 In these contexts, investigative bodies necessarily have an interest in ensuring the conclusion of an investigation before the possible infringement of an electoral right becomes irreparable101 and in preventing a lingering dispute that may bring the democratic process to a standstill, particularly in a tense political climate.102 Investigative bodies should, therefore, consider what a reasonable amount of time would be that is necessary for promptly resolving election disputes. Many countries include deadlines for resolving disputes into their laws or regulations, but it is less common to add formal time limits to the investiga96 Venice Commission, Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters: Guidelines and Explanatory Report ¶ 95, 52nd Sess., Op. No. 190/2002 (May 23, 2003) (The Venice Commission points to two pitfalls in delaying the resolution of an election appeals process: “appeal proceedings retard the electoral process, and. . . due to their lack of suspensive effect, decisions on appeals which could have been taken before, are taken after the elections.”).; see also Benjamin E. Griffith & Michael S. Carr, Effective, Timely, Appropriate, and Enforceable Remedies, in International Election Principles: Democracy & the Rule of Law 373–397 (John Hardin Young ed., 12th ed., 2009). 97 Inter-Parliamentary Council, Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Elections art. 4, ¶ 9 (Mar. 26, 1994), http://www. ipu.org/cnl-e/154-free.htm. 98 OSCE Office of Democratic Insts. & Human Rights (ODIHR), Existing Commitments for Democratic Elections in OSCE Participating States ¶ 10.4 (Oct. 2003), http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/13957. 99 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Inter-Parliamentary Union, Free and Fair Elections: International Law and Practice 158 (2006), http://www.ipu.‌org‌/‌pdf/publications/free&fair06-e.pdf. 100 Id. 101 Jesús Orozco-Henríquez et al., Int’l Inst. for Democracy & Electoral Assistance, Electoral Justice: The International IDEA Handbook 127 (2010). 102 Autheman, supra note 52, at 6. 51