process. In Namat Alieyev v. Azerbaijan, the ECtHR held that time restraints “may not serve to undermine the effectiveness of the appeal procedure, and it must be ensured that a genuine effort is made to address the substance of arguable individual complaints concerning electoral irregularities.”66 Due process is critical to the perception of fairness of the process and institution, which is discussed further below. Lastly, it is important to consider the effectiveness of a resolution versus a remedy. Given the importance of due process requirements for a fair hearing, and the fact that these requirements by their nature require a certain amount of time (e.g., notifying parties or preparing a defense), it may be that applying a practical resolution to a violation or irregularity may ultimately protect the integrity of the electoral process more effectively than a formal legal remedy which requires more time to determine and apply. However, the more informal resolution of irregularities should also be provided for in the regulatory framework and not simply applied on an ad hoc basis depending on the particular election official or decision maker. To measure the effectiveness of remedies in terms of timeliness, several factors should be examined, including the legal framework, the deadlines set therein, the actual time taken to resolve complaints, and the impact any delay has on the election or office in question. 3. A remedy should be proportional to the violation As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, violations or irregularities often have relatively minor consequences and do not amount to violation of any fundamental human right. However, as discussed further by Quinn and Ennis later in this volume, this fact does not mean that election contestants should be permitted to flout the law with impunity.67 Rather, remedies for these violations should be proportionate to the harm caused. For example, in many cases, an injunction or directive from an election management body may be a sufficient to remedy a violation of a rule against campaigning on Election Day. The availability of a range of remedies is necessary to ensure proportionality of the sanctioning system. As outlined by Magnus Ohman and Megan Ritchie in a separate chapter on campaign finance in this volume, a fraud violation such as vote buying or bribing election officials should carry a heavier penalty, such as not being able to run for office for a certain period, including for the purposes of deterrence. 68 Conversely, a malpractice violation, such as inadvertently failing to submit campaign finance disclosure forms by the established deadlines, should attract a lighter penalty, such as a warning or a fine, unless it is found that the intention was to hide controversial transactions. As Ohman and Ritchie note, fines are particularly conducive to proportionality, since they can easily be varied from a small amount that is more symbolic in nature to a more substantial amount that can curb the activities of political actors.69 The Philippines complaint adjudication system provides an example of the broad spectrum of electoral offense sanctions. In 2004, IFES reported that the penalties implemented by the Philippines electoral authorities were harsh and not proportional to the committed offense. These harsh sanctions could discourage people from bringing a claim, as a prospective claimant might not want to condemn a poll worker to jail time (the sanction provided in the law) 66 Namat Aliyev, supra note 35 at ¶ 90. Chapter 6 of this volume 68 Chapter 10 of this volume 69 Id. 67