for an offense such as failing to post the list of voters in the correct location. 70 IFES recommended that the legislative authority delink criminal and electoral law and establish sanctions more appropriate for the offenses in question, such as fines, loss of media access, campaign restrictions, and public apologies, recommendations that were ultimately put into effect by the legislature. 71 Whether a remedy is proportional to a violation depends on a variety of different factors. For example, in the U.S., certain factors will increase recommended sentences for election fraud under the sentencing guidelines, including whether a defendant occupies a leadership or supervisory role in an election fraud scheme or abuses a position of public or private trust; if individual voters are viewed as vulnerable victims; if there is obstruction; or if the election fraud involved corrupting a public official.72 As outlined by this example, to measure the proportionality of remedies, one must consider the violation, the impact it has had on the entire process, what will correct the mistake or wrongdoing, and what deterrence is required to ensure others do not repeat the illegal act or careless mistake. 4. A remedy must be enforceable The right to a remedy cannot be effective if the remedy is not implemented, but enforcement requires the cooperation of diverse authorities responsible for the implementation of administrative or judicial decisions.73 The enforcement component of a remedy is the critical element that distinguishes it from simply an idea or decision, and actualizes the right in a tangible manner. In the 1838 case Kendall v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court observed that “[t]he power to enforce the performance of the act must rest somewhere, or it will present a case which has often been said to involve a monstrous absurdity in a well- organized government, that there should be no remedy, although a clear and undeniable right should be shown to exist.”74 A lack of proper enforcement can undermine the right to an effective remedy and must be addressed if the electoral dispute resolution process – and the electoral process as a whole – is to be respected by the electorate and if electoral and judicial institutions are to be seen as legitimate. In Petkov v. Bulgaria the ECtHR stressed that the “rule of law — one of the fundamental principles of a democratic society — entails a duty on the part of the State and public authorities to comply with judicial orders or decisions against them.”75 In this case, three applicants alleged that their rights to run for office in the 2001 parliamentary elections had been unfairly abrogated.76 The applicants’ coalition withdrew their names from the candidates’ list due to their links with the former State security agencies.77 The Supreme Administrative Court ruled in the applicants’ coalition’s favor and declared the striking of the applicants off the lists of 70 71 Peter Erben, Beverly Hagerdon Thakur, Craig Jenness, & Ian Smith, CEPPS Philippines Election Observation Program Strengthening the Electoral Process IFES Final Report, IFES (2004), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pdacw958.pdf. Id. CRAIG C. DONSANTO & NANCY L. SIMMONS, FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF ELECTION OFFENSES, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST. (7th ed. 2007) http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal/legacy/2013/09/30/electbook-0507.pdf 73 GUIDELINES FOR UNDERSTANDING, supra note 7 at 64. 74 Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. 524, 624 (1838). 75 Petkov, supra note 34 at ¶ 62. (“The applicants complained of the electoral authorities’ refusal to comply with the final judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court declaring their striking off the lists of candidates null and void, and of their resulting inability to stand in the parliamentary elections on 17 June 2001.”). 76 Id. at ¶¶ 55-82. 77 Id. at ¶ 60. 72