To effectively deter, the availability and application of sanctions must be known. The right of redress cannot be fully effective if the electorate and the candidates are not aware of existing sanctions for violations. Without clear procedures and publication of resolutions or remedies, the deterrence value decreases. Beyond these clarity and transparency measures, penalties or sanctions must be sufficiently strict to deter each different kind of violation, without being disproportionate or heavy-handed. In an article titled “The Enforcement Blues: Formal and Informal Sanctions for Campaign Finance Violations,” Todd Lochner and Bruce E. Calin note that “[b]ecause election law implicates important constitutional rights, the use of criminal sanctions can only be imposed in the most egregious cases. Thus, the enforcement of violations usually involves the question of how great a fine to impose…[which has] different effects on wealthier and less affluent candidates.” 83 International IDEA sets out a revealing case study in the Electoral Justice Handbook on the effectiveness of financial sanctions in deterrence, which may differ depending on the context: Provision for gender quotas was included in electoral law in France in the French ‘Parity Law’ of 2000. Under this provision, political parties that did not nominate a stated percentage of women would be fined by a reduction in the funding that their party received from the state. Some parties in France itself were not keen to comply, and regarded the fine as small: they did not nominate enough women, and they were fined. The same legislation applied in the overseas departments of France, including New Caledonia. The parties in New Caledonia, which is poorer than France, regarded exactly the same level of fines as high and as a deterrent, and ensured that they complied with the legislation. The election in New Caledonia produced a legislative body composed almost equally of women and men . . . [w]hat is proportionate and effective in one place is not necessarily so in another.84 In our survey of IFES field offices, electoral experts acknowledged the challenges regarding deterrent effect of remedies in the law. In Ukraine, “administrative fines for many election-related violations are too small to be considered effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions . . . [and] for certain violations of the election laws…no sanctions are provided at all.” In Myanmar, “because there is no provision regarding the sanctioning of civil servants – this creates no deterrence.” As Magnus Ohman and Megan Ritchie outline in a separate chapter in this volume on campaign finance, sanctions will be more effective in deterrence if all parties engaged in a violation are penalized.85 For example, a sanction may be imposed on a political party for receiving illegal campaign contributions, but if those making these illegal contributions are not also punished, the deterrence impact may appear weaker. In the U.S. Department of Justice manual on ‘Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses,” the authors include a newspaper editorial from Eastern Kentucky University to illustrate why prosecuting election crimes is important to send a message to the populace that electoral actors will be held to account: “the people…were effectively robbed of their voting rights by Newsome and others dolling out cash to buy a public office…federal authorities have pledged to continue 83 Todd Lochner Bruce E. Cain, The Enforcement Blues: Formal and Informal Sanctions For Campaign Finance Violations, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 629 (2000), https://www.wcl.american.edu/journal/alr/52/52-2lochner.pdf. 84 OROZCO-HENRIQUEZ, supra note 7 at 50 ¶ 123. 85 Chapter 10 of this volume.