IFES Ukraine
in the second reading by the 423-member Verkhovna Rada. The code would enter legal force only if
promulgated by the President. In the current political environment, there is a lack of consensus among
MPs on such key elements of the draft code as the choice of electoral system for parliamentary and
local elections, the procedure for establishing lower-level election commissions, as well as whether or
not to fully enfranchise IDPs and mobile groups of citizens, among others. Thus, the prospect for
adopting the election code well in advance of the 2019 October parliamentary elections is dwindling.
Given that the adoption of the draft election code well before the fall 2019 elections does not seem
realistic and further will contradict the internationally recognized principle of stability of election
laws, the Rada needs to focus on fixing the flaws in the existing laws governing elections in Ukraine.
Election security
Despite serious external and internal security threats to the 2019 presidential election, for the most
part these threats never materialized. The situation on the line of contact in the East between the
Armed Forces of Ukraine and Russian-backed separatists remained the same as before the election
and did not affect election preparations in the adjacent districts in government-controlled areas. This
is a positive sign and increases the prospects for holding local elections in newly amalgamated
communities in these areas. At an early stage of the election process, certain far-right para-military
groups made statements that they would “protect” the election by force; these claims never
materialized into concrete action. The role of the police during the first and second round in protecting
public order received a positive response from election observers across the board.
While cybersecurity attacks were an issue of concern during the 2014 elections, installment of the
new cybersecurity equipment procured with IFES support, as well as cybersecurity trainings delivered
to the CEC secretariat staff contributed to preventing any serious external interference in the
electronic databases (voter registers, results management system, etc.) administered by the CEC. The
CEC should further continue its efforts aimed to ensure an appropriate level of cyber security
protection of its electronic systems.
Election administration
The Central Election Commission (CEC)
Under the Presidential Election Law, the presidential election is administered by a three-tier system
of election commissions: the Central Election Commission (CEC), District Election Commissions (DECs),
and Precinct Election Commissions (PECs). For the 2019 election, the CEC created 199 DECs and
established 29,289 PECs in-country. No DECs or PECs were established in the non-government
controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, as well as in Russian-annexed Crimea and
Sevastopol. For out-of-country voting, the CEC established 101 PECs at diplomatic and consular
representations of Ukraine abroad. Due to security threats and based on a suggestion by the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, the CEC decided to close all polling stations in the Russian Federation and referred
some 54,000 registered voters residing in Russia to vote at diplomatic representations of Ukraine in
three neighboring states.
According to the assessment of most international election observers (including OSCE/ODIHR, NDI,
and IRI), the CEC operated in a professional, collegial manner and met all legal deadlines. While CEC
operations were assessed as transparent in general, international and domestic observers criticized
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