law – with which the majority of the public is unlikely to engage – may be insufficient in many jurisdictions. Rather, reforms to court administration and support for outreach activities to the media, civil society, and the public likely will become increasingly required. Losing parties may feel aggrieved after losing important cases and lash out, seeking to discredit the courts. In recent years, this problem has evolved as foreign actors amplify domestic voices. In the United States, the NCSC identified four new, specific themes related to disinformation and elections that foreign actors often use when seeking to discredit a judicial system: • The justice system ignores voting irregularities and fraud, allowing elections to be stolen from certain candidates. • The justice system tips the electoral map in favor of a particular party. • The justice system is unaccountable. Therefore, judges should be subject to threats of violence to keep them in line. • Decisions by the court are political and can be leaked for political purposes. 68 As the case law has shown, many of these themes are echoed in jurisdictions other than the United States – for instance, in the recent Kenya elections. While the nature of these threats evolves constantly, we can draw from the selected cases and discussion the following emerging lessons learned on institutional reforms that can support the courts in countering disinformation campaigns against them. A. Foster Preventive Measures Ahead of the Elections Given that widespread disinformation campaigns during elections can severely undermine public trust in the judiciary, maximum planning and transparency is vital to enable judges and EMBs to respond quickly to such threats. This requires the courts to adopt a communication strategy during elections to counter attacks against judges and to conduct training on communication in crisis and any useful digital tools at the judiciary’s disposal to combat disinformation. It also requires EMBs to communicate as much information as possible to all stakeholders before an election. 69 Sometimes this might be as simple as inviting cameras into the courtroom to ensure the hearing process is livestreamed with decisions summarized for the media, as judges did in Kenya during the 2017 and 2022 elections or in Nigeria during the 2023 elections, when the judges gave an 11-hour livestreamed reading of their judgment. Increasingly, more strategic reforms may be required. In Arizona in 2019, the Supreme Court of Arizona established the Task Force on Countering Disinformation by Administrative Order No. 2019-114 70 to study and National Center for State Courts. (2023). Disinformation and the courts. Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening. (2021). Countering Disinformation Guide 70 Supreme Court of the State of Arizona. (2019). In the Matter of Establishment of the Task Force on Countering Disinformation. Administrative Order No. 2019-114 68 69 20