231 112 S.Ct. 1846, 119 L.Ed.2d 5 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the. judgment) (arguing that viewpoint-neutral restrictions on speech in the vicinity of polling places should not be subject to strict scrutiny because they restrict speech in what is traditionally a nonpublic forum). For similar reasons, a law that restricts a person’s ability to tell others how he has voted is not exempt from strict scrutiny merely because the ballot'itself is a nonpublic forum. See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 363, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997) (“Ballots serve primarily to elect candidates, not as forums for political expression”); The law at issue here does not restrict what a voter may write on his ballot; it regulates the way in which he can disclose his vote to others. Thus, the nonpublic forum doctrine cannot, be invoked to save the law from strict scrutiny because the speech that the law restricts necessarily occurs in forums that the government does not own or control. To illustrate the point, consider a law that bens public discussion of what is said at a candidate debate held by a public broadcaster. Is there any doubt that such a law would be subject to strict scrutiny even though the Supreme Court has held that the debate itself occurs in a nonpublic forum? See Ark Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 680, 118 S.Ct. 1633, 140 L.Ed.2d 875 (1998) (debate conducted by a public broadcaster is a nonpublic fo7. In his brief, the Secretary characterized the state’s interests in three different ways, apparently dependent upon which level of scrutiny applies. First, asserting that the law is content neutral, he argued that the law furthers "the important governmental 'interest of ensuring the purity and integrity of our elections.” Doc. No. 22-1 at 2 (emphasis added). Second, applying the standard for contentneutral restrictions on speech, the Secretary identified the state’s ''significant, interest in thwarting one party's ability to confirm how rum). Obviously not. For the same reasons, the. law at issue here is not -exempt from strict scrutiny merely because the ballot itself is a nonpublic forum. B. Strict Scrutiny Because the 2014 amendment to RSA ‘659:35, I is a content-based restriction on speech; it can stand only if it-survives strict scrutiny, “'which requires the Government to prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest'.’” Reed, 135 S.Ct. at -2231 (quoting Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S.Ct. at 2817). The Secretary bears the' burden of establishing both requirements. See id. As I explain below, he has faded to meet his burden on either part of the strict scrutiny test. 1. State'Interests The Secretary argues that a ban on displays of completed ballots serves the state’s compelling interest in preventing vote buying and voter coercion.7 While both interests are plainly compelling in the abstract, the mere assertion of such interests cannot sustain a content-based speech restriction. For an interest to be sufficiently compelling, the state must demonstrate that jt. addresses . an actual problem. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 131 S.Ct. 2729, 2738, 180 L.Ed.2d 708 (2011) (“The state must specifically identianother party'has voted thereby making it impossible for a party purchasing a vote to visually confirm'the vote that is being purchased.” Id. at 8 (emphasis added). Finally, he argued that even if strict scrutiny applies, "preventing voter intimidation and election fraud is a compelling interest.” Id. at 14 (emphasis added). Collectively, these three characterizations address two interests: presenting vote buying and preventing voter coercion. I treat-these two interests as the government’s asserted interests.--