230 tainment Group, Inc., -“[t]he distinction between laws burdening and laws banning speech is but a matter of degree. The Government’s content-based burdens must satisfy the same rigorous scrutiny as its content-based bans.” 529 U.S, 803, 812, 120 S.Ct. 1878, 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000). Here, the law at issue is a content-based restriction on speech that deprives voters of one of their most powerful means of letting the world know how they voted. The legislature cannot avoid strict scrutiny when it adopts such a law merely by leaving voters with other arguably less effective means of speaking on the subject. .The Secretary also argues that the law should not be considered a content-based restriction on speech because paragraph II of RSA 669:35 additionally prohibits a voter from placing “a distinguishing mark upon his or her ballot.” See N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 659:35, II. That is, because paragraph ÍI prohibits another type of marking on ballots, the new law barring a voter from disclosing an image of a marked ballot is content neutral. This argument fails. The two paragraphs simply regulate two different categories of speech: paragraph I regulates a certain type of speech that ordinarily occurs outside the polling place and paragraph II regulates what types of markings a voter can maké on a' ballot while in the polling place. Because paragraph I regulates speech based on the content conveyed, paragraph II cannot save it from being a content-based restriction on speech. In a last-ditch effort to save the law from strict scrutiny, the Secretary argues that completed ballots are a form of government speech and thus do not trigger First Amendment protection at all. He cites Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, which held that Texas’s specialty license plate designs constituted government speech and thus Texas was entitled to refuse to issue plates featuring a group’s proposed design- . — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2239, 2253, 192 L.Ed.2d 274 (2015). In reaching its decision, the Court in Walker relied on the facts that (1) license plates “long have communicated messages from the States,” (2) Texas-license plate designs “are often closely identified in the-public mind with the State;” and (3) Texas maintains direct control over the messages conveyed on its specialty plates. Id, at 2248-49 (internal quotations and alterations omitted). The problem at issue here, however, is quite different from the problem the Court reFirst, ballots do not solved in Wafer. communicate messages from the state; they simply list slates of candidates. Second, although blank ballots may be identified with the state, there is no possibility that a voter’s marking on a ballot will be misinterpreted as state speech. Third, New Hampshire, does not maintain direct control over the messages that people convey on ballots, apart from the restriction that they place no distinguishing mark on their ballot. See N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 659:35, II. Accordingly, any markings that voters place on their ballots cléarly do not qualify as government speech. Although the Secretary does not press the' point, Representative Horrigan also suggested during debate on the new law that it could be justified because it regulates speech at the polling place where electioneering is not permitted. I disagree. RSA 659:35, I does not bar voters from taking pictures of their completed ballots before they are cast. What they may not do is disclose images of a completed ballot to others. Because disclosure will generally take place far away from the polling place, the Secretary cannot prevent the new law from being subject to strict scrutiny by claiming that it is merely a restriction on speech in a nonpublic forum, where speech rights are more limited. See e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 214,