228 inferences in its favor. See Navarro v. social media, is an.important and effective Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 94 (1st Cir.2001). means of political expression that is proA party seeking summary judgment tected by the First Amendment. In conmust first identify the absence of any gen- trast, Secretary Gardner defends ..the law uine dispute of material fact. Celotex primarily by arguing that it is a necessary Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 restraint on speech that is required to S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A ma- prevent vote buying and voter coercion. terial fact “is one ‘that might affect the The. Supreme Court has develoutcome of the suit under the governing oped a template for resolving conflicts belaw.’” United States v. One Parcel of tween speech rights and governmental inReal Prop, with Bldgs., 960 F.2d 200, 204 terests. Speech restrictions are first (1st Cir.1992) (quoting Anderson v. Liber- sorted by whether they are content based ty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. or content neutral. Content-based re2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). If the mov- strictions are subject to strict scrutiny, ing party satisfies this burden, the non-- “ ‘which requires the Government to moving party must then “produce evidence prove that the restriction furthers a comon which a reasonable finder of fact, under pelling interest and is narrowly tailored the appropriate proof burden, could base a to achieve that interest.’ ” Reed v. Town verdict for it; if that party cannot produce 135 S.Ct. 2218, of Gilbert, — U.S. -, such evidence, the motion must be granted.” 2231, 192 L.Ed.2d 236 (2015) (quoting Ay- ala-Gerena v. Bristol Myers-Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club Squibb Co., 95 F.3d 86, 94 (1st Cir.1996); PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 131 S.Ct. see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. 2806, 2817, 180 L.Ed.2d 664 (2011)). ConOn cross motions for summary judg- tent-neutral restrictions, however, are ment, the standard of review is applied to subject only to intermediate scrutiny, each motion separately. See Am. Home meaning “the government may impose Assurance Co. v. AGM Marine Contrac- reasonable restrictions on the time, place, tors, Inc., 467 F.3d 810, 812 (1st Cir.2006); or manner of protected speech,” so long see also Mandel v. Boston Phoenix, Inc., as “ ‘they are narrowly tailored to serve a 456 F.3d 198, 205 (1st Cir.2006) (“The significant governmental interest, and that presence of cross-motions for summary they leave open ample alternative chanjudgment neither dilutes nor distorts this nels for communication of the informastandard of review.”). . Hence, I must detion.’ ” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, termine “whether either of the parties de491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 serves judgment as a matter of law on L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) (quoting Clark v. facts that are not disputed.” Adria Int'l Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 Group, Inc. v. Ferre Dev., Inc., 241 F.3d U.S. 288, 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 103, 107 (1st Cir.2001). 221 (1984)). III. ANALYSIS Plaintiffs challenge only the portion of RSA 659:35,1 that makes it unlawful for a voter to take and disclose an image of his or her marked ballot. As they see it, this act of disclosure, which ordinarily occurs far-from the polling place and will generally be accomplished through the use of I begin by determining whether the 2014 amendment to RSA 659:35, I is a content-based or ; content-neutral restriction on speech. A. Content Neutrality As the Supreme Court recently explained in Reed v. Town of Gilbert,