Chapter 2: Legal Frameworks for Effective Election Complaints Adjudication Systems law under which it is established; the method of appointment of its members; the professional experience and standing of members; the security of funding it receives; its ability to hire and retain competent professional staff who support its independence; and the public respect it gains from the credibility of its election processes. The inclusion of the word “independent” in the provision that establishes the election complaints authority is most important. √ Membership: Members should ideally be appointed to ensure that they are non-partisan, or, if that is not possible, that the political influence is balanced. Nominations by political parties lead inevitably to politicization and are not recommended. Appropriate nominators include: the courts; an association of universities; a well established human rights organization; the law society; a national business association; or a national labor organization. √ Terms of appointment: The term of appointment should be sufficient to encompass preparation and training before the election to the resolution of complaints after the election. Between elections, members should be available on a day-by-day basis for approving reports and making decisions regarding permanent staff, among other duties. Continuity of records and staff expertise would be maintained by the few key staff that would remain. √ Member characteristics: As an election complaints authority has a quasi-judicial role, its members are usually senior judges or lawyers. In many countries, the amount of time needed for this work would not prevent a judge or lawyer from taking an appointment and maintaining a permanent position as a judge or practicing lawyer. In other countries, the extent and complexity of elections would necessitate a leave of absence. √ Funding: The election complaints authority should be funded by an annual budget that comes from the legislature and should not be routed through the Ministry of Finance. This prevents the governing party from having an undue influence on the budget and places its review before an open, public and multi-party committee. 127