Chapter 1: International Standards of checks and balances is crucial to addressing the potential corruption and influence that exists within the institutions in charge of the appointment. In certain political cultures, providing an impartial arbiter may require more stringent measures to ensure independence. In Nicaragua, seven commissioners appointed by the National Assembly with a qualified majority of 60 percent head the Consejo Supremo Electoral (CSE), the adjudicative body for non-criminal electoral complaints. The President and the National Assembly both present nominations for the position of commissioners “in consultation with civil society.”113 Despite this checks and balances mechanism, the political parties generally put the independence of the CSE in jeopardy and elect commissioners with a very strong political profile. In Brazil, the Superior Electoral Court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral) uses another interesting appointment procedure.114 The TSE has jurisdiction over all aspects of elections and regulates the functioning of political parties. The Constitution is very specific about the composition of the Superior Electoral Court.115 There are seven judges: three judges are elected from among the members of the Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal); two judges are elected from among the members of the Superior Court of Justice (Superior Tribunal de Justiça); and two judges are named by the President of the Republic, chosen among six attorneys of renowned legal knowledge and good moral reputation that are appointed by the Federal Supreme Court. To maintain the non-political character of the electoral courts, the judges serve for a two-year period and cannot hold office for more than two consecutive periods.116 The clear and transparent Brazilian system, which helps to ensure impartiality, can be contrasted with the processes in Jordan and Lebanon. The constitution of Jordan provides that the newly-elected Parliament is the entity Constitución Política de Nicaragua [Political Constitution of Nicaragua] Jan. 1, 1987, art. 138, § 7; art. 150, § 14; E.U. Nicaragua Report, supra note 38, at 23. 114 Brazil Superior Electoral Court, supra note 6. 115 Constituição Federal [C.F.] [Constitution] art. 119 (Braz.). 116 Id. art. 121, § 1; see also, e.g., Ruben Hernandez Valle, Costa Rica: A Powerful Constitutional Body, Case Study 1 (“The TSE consists of three regular judges and six substitute judges . . . . Their appointment is made by two-thirds of the members of the Supreme Court of Justice.”), available at http://www.Idea.int/publications/emd/upload/EMD_CS_Costa_Rica. pdf. 113 41