Guidelines for Understanding, Adjudicating, and Resolving Disputes in Elections empowered to handle petitions that challenge the results of the Parliamentary elections.117 In Lebanon, the electoral complaints adjudication process specifically, and the judiciary in general, lack independence from both the executive and the legislative bodies. This was most strikingly in evidence when, during the 1996 parliamentary elections, “the Ministry of Interior declined to provide the Constitutional Council, in charge of electoral supervision, with the minutes and other original documents to enable it to perform its mission, as some of these documents were burned.”118 Moreover, in August 2003, the mandates of five of the 10 members of the Constitutional Council expired without any new appointment, leading to the de facto paralysis of that institution until 2009.119 The conflict of interest and the interference of politicians in the work of the adjudication bodies in these countries clearly fall short of the requirement for an impartial and independent arbiter. The process for removal of judges and arbiters is also a key component in creating an impartial adjudicative system, and should balance the need to isolate adjudicators from short-term political influence while also providing for a means for removal for truly corrupt actions. For instance, in Brazil, the Constitution provides that the judges from the Electoral Supreme Court and the Regional Court while in office are non-removable.120 This provision ensures that an arbiter or a judge will not be removed arbitrarily based on political manipulation or undue influence. However, the electoral law or rules of procedure should set up clear and transparent rules to discipline or dismiss members if they act improperly or if they fail in the performance of their duties.121 Such rules should be an integral part of any Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Jan. 1, 1952, art. 71; see also Democracy Reporting International, Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center, Assessment of the Electoral Framework: The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 2, 26 (2007) [hereinafter Jordan Electoral Assessment], available at http://www.democracy-reporting.org/files/dri_report_jordan.pdf. 118 Jordan Electoral Assessment, supra note 117, at 2, 26. 119 Id. at 30. 120 Constituição Federal [C.F.] [Constitution] art. 121, § 1 (Braz.). 121 USAId Office of Democracy and Governance, Technical Publication Series, GuIdance for Promoting Judicial Independence and Impartiality 20 (2002) [hereinafter USAId GuIdance] (“When disciplinary processes work correctly, they protect the integrity of the judiciary and its independence. However, disciplinary proceedings may be brought for political reasons or to punish judges who render decisions contrary to the views of their superiors. Substantive differences that should be resolved by appealing cases to a higher court may instead form the basis for disciplinary actions. Not uncommonly, disciplinary processes are bypassed entirely in removing judges from office. A well-structured disciplinary procedure reduces the vulnerability to abuses that affects judicial independence.”), available at http:// www.usaId.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/pnacm007.pdf. 117 42