Guidelines for Understanding, Adjudicating, and Resolving Disputes in Elections was at stake. Such dismissals of legitimate claims can lead to a major distrust in the electoral process. Ultimately, the choice of standard of proof often depends on the rules of procedure of a country’s legal system. In some countries, the law does not make any distinction between administrative or criminal claims and thus, the standard of proof remains the same regardless the specific nature of the dispute. Thus, varying standards of evidence may be used in election complaint adjudication around the world. A uniform standard will probably not be adequate to handle every type of electoral complaint, and it can be dangerous to impose one standard over the others. In light of these considerations, a complaints adjudication entity should be prepared to require differing thresholds for evidence that the petitioner must provide depending on the nature of the claim at stake.198 For example, there is a great difference between a case in which a complainant argues to overturn a nationwide election result, and a claim of ballot stuffing in an isolated precinct, and the standards of evidence required for those claims might reflect those practical differences. The choice of what standard to apply to each type of electoral complaint might be made by the electoral management body, set by legislation, or even mandated in a national constitution. Regardless, the exact standard to be applied in any particular case should be established in advance of the hearing rather than chosen by the arbiter on an ad hoc basis.199 The level of flexibility permitted within a defined standard will depend on the type of complaint at issue. As noted by Lord Denning in Bater v. Bater, a civil court considering a charge of fraud will naturally require a higher degree of probability than it would require if considering a charge of negligence. For example, in its judgment on the 2001 Zambian presidential elections petition against President Levy Mwanawasa, the Supreme Court of Zambia referred to its previous case of Lewanika v. Chiluba, which affirmed that “it cannot be seriously disputed that Parliamentary Election Petitions have generally long required to be proved to a standard higher Bater v. Bater, [1951] P. 35, 37 (C.A.) (U.K.) (“The degree of probability in civil cases depends on the subject matter in question.”). Similar reasons were used in support of the criminal standard later in Preston-Jones v. Preston-Jones, [1951] A.C. 391, [1951] 1 All E.R. 124 (H.L.) (U.K.) (determining legitimacy of a child in petition for divorce based on adultery claim); see also, In re Doherty, House of Lords, [2008] UKHL 33 (appeal taken from N. Ir.). 199 See supra Part 2 (describing the international standard of a clearly defined regimen of electoral standards and procedures). 198 66