desired Individual Plaintiffs’ votes to be cancelled. To the contrary, this email suggests that Secretary Boockvar encouraged counties to allow exactly these types of votes to be counted. Without more, this Court cannot conclude that Individual Plaintiffs have sufficiently established that their injuries are fairly traceable to Secretary Boockvar.56 3. Redressability In large part because the Individual Plaintiffs cannot establish that their injury is “fairly traceable” to the Defendants’ conduct, they also cannot show that their injury could be redressed by a favorable decision from this Court.57 Beyond that substantial hurdle, however, a review of the injury alleged and the relief sought plainly shows that the Individual Plaintiffs’ injury would not be redressable. The Individual Plaintiffs base their equal-protection claim on the theory that their 56 57 The Third Circuit has held that a party may have standing “to challenge government action that permits or authorizes third-party conduct that would otherwise be illegal in the absence of the Government’s action.” Constitution Party of Pennsylvania v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 366 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Bloomberg L.P. v. CFTC, 949 F. Supp. 2d 91, 116 (D.D.C. 2013)). But in that case, standing was permitted to avoid a catch-22 situation where, absent standing against a third-party government actor, a plaintiff would not be able to bring suit against any responsible party. Id. at 367. Here, Plaintiffs allege that Secretary Boockvar is responsible for authorizing the unconstitutional actions of Defendant Counties. However, unlike the plaintiffs in Aichele, Plaintiffs are able to sue Defendant Counties for their allegedly unconstitutional actions. Moreover, because this Court has already concluded that Plaintiffs lack standing to sue Defendant Counties for their use of the notice-and-cure policy, it would be counterintuitive for Plaintiffs to have standing to challenge Secretary Boockvar’s authorization of this policy, which is even further removed from any purported harm that Individual Plaintiffs have suffered. See, e.g., Newdow v. Roberts, 603 F.3d 1002, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting that when an injury is caused by a third party not before the Court, courts cannot “redress injury . . . that results from [such] independent action.”) (ellipses and alterations in original) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)). - 17 -