Tan Cheng Bock v AG [2017] SGCA 50 taking into account its context in the written law and the purpose or object underlying the written law; and (b) the need to avoid prolonging legal or other proceedings without compensating advantage. 37 The correct approach to purposive interpretation under s 9A was summarised following close analysis in the judgment of the minority in Attorney-General v Ting Choon Meng and another appeal [2017] 1 SLR 373 (“Ting Choon Meng”), a recent decision of this court on which both the parties and the Judge relied heavily. Although we refer principally to the minority judgement, there was no disagreement on the broad steps to be taken in purposively interpreting a legislative provision. It was noted at [59] that the court’s task when undertaking a purposive interpretation of a legislative provision involves three steps: (a) First, ascertain the possible interpretations of the provision, having regard not just to the text of the provision but also to the context of that provision within the written law as a whole. (b) Second, ascertain the legislative purpose or object of the statute. (c) Third, compare the possible interpretations of the text against the purposes or objects of the statute. These steps mirrored, and set out in greater specificity, the approach taken by the majority in Ting Choon Meng, which also began by interpreting the text of the legislative provision in question in the context of the statute as a whole before considering its legislative purpose (see Ting Choon Meng at [19]). 38 The first of these steps is fairly uncontroversial. It requires a court to ascertain the possible interpretations of the provision. A court does so by determining the ordinary meaning of the words of the legislative provision. It 19