Tan Cheng Bock v AG [2017] SGCA 50 can be aided in this effort by a number of rules and canons of statutory construction, all of which are grounded in logic and common sense. We mention two rules which we will refer to in due course. One is that Parliament shuns tautology and does not legislate in vain; the court should therefore endeavour to give significance to every word in an enactment (see JD Ltd v Comptroller of Income Tax [2006] 1 SLR 484 at [43]). Another relevant rule is that Parliament is presumed not to have intended an unworkable or impracticable result, so an interpretation that leads to such a result would not be regarded as a possible one (see Hong Leong Bank Bhd v Soh Seow Poh [2009] 4 SLR(R) 525 at [40]). Distinguishing between specific and general purposes 39 It is the second step of the analysis – formulating the legislative purpose of a provision – which tends to present difficulty. Casting the legislative purpose differently or at different levels of generality may result in varying and even conflicting interpretations. The articulation of purpose at different levels of generality could also result in the court describing the purpose in whatever terms would support its preferred interpretation (as was observed in Ting Choon Meng at [60]). Thus, properly identifying the legislative purpose is of paramount importance. 40 It is important here to distinguish between the specific purpose underlying a particular provision and the general purpose or purposes underlying the statute as a whole or the relevant part of the statute. As noted in Ting Choon Meng at [60], the words of s 9A of the IA are ambiguous as to which purpose is best considered in this context. This is because it refers both to the purpose underlying the “written law” (in s 9A(1)) and to that underlying the “provision of the written law” (in s 9A(2)–(3)). As was observed in Ting Choon Meng at [61], “the purpose behind a particular provision may yet be distinct 20