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Tan Cheng Bock v AG [2017] SGCA 50 an interpretation which depends on so serious and glaring a contradiction can be justified. 91 Furthermore, such a construction would (as the Respondent points out) be inconsistent with the position the Appellant takes before us. The Appellant’s position is that the first term to be counted could be that of President Ong or any of the Presidents who took office after him but not that of any who held the office before him. Yet if we were to interpret “this Constitution” here to mean the Constitution as it stands after the 2016 Amendment, it would be impermissible to count the terms of office of any of the previous Presidents, regardless of how they were elected to office. This is because President Ong and each of his successors – although elected by the citizens of Singapore – were nonetheless elected under previous iterations of the Constitution, and not the Constitution as it now stands. For one thing, the 2016 Amendment updated the eligibility criteria and introduced a new certification process. These changes are reflected in the presently amended form of Art 19. It is undisputed that President Ong, President Nathan and President Tan all did not undergo the processes set out in the present iteration of Art 19. Hence, on this interpretation, Parliament could not specify the term of office of any previous President as the first term, but as we have noted, this is so plainly contrary to the express terms of Art 164 that it must be rejected. 92 Such an interpretation of “this Constitution” could also make Art 19B unworkable moving forward. If “this Constitution” means the latest iteration of the Constitution as it stands from time to time, then the goal of having reserved elections might be frustrated indefinitely if the count has to start afresh each time any part of the Constitution is amended. This seems illogical and counterintuitive. 46

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Tan Chen Bock v. Attorney General

Judgment

Question Presented: Whether the reserved election clause solely permits choosing from the terms of office of Presidents elected by the citizens, or also includes those chosen by Parliament.

Alleged Acts: The case comes before the court on Art. 19B(1) and 164. Art. 19B(1) introducing a reserved election where the office of the President is reserved for candidates of a particular community if no person from that particular community has held office for the five most recent terms of office. The law defined community as Chinese, Malay, Indian, and other minority communities. Three individuals held the office for five terms and were not Malay. Therefore, the 2017 election was reserved for a candidate from that community. The appellant argues that this does not apply to those candidates elected by Parliament, but only to those elected by the people, which would not reserve the office for a Malay candidate.

Procedural history: The appellant filed suit in the High Court seeking voidance of Art. 19 and 164. The High Court dismissed the application on July 7, 2017. The appellant appealed to the current court and the Court heard the case on expedited basis because the Government sought to issue a writ of election for the next presidential election. The appellant appealed the case stating that lower court erroneously stated that “President” applies to those both elected by the people and Parliament, that the last term of President Wee was set as the first term in the five, and that President Wee was elected by the citizens.

Summary: The court determined that the appellant’s argument was one based primarily on the text of the constitution. The Constitution defines a President as one elected under the Constitution, not necessarily those elected under 2016 Amendments. The appellant argued that only Presidents that underwent the prior reform process may not be counted or considered Presidents. However, the court rejected this because the legislative intent was not to preclude any of the previous Presidents under this and create an unworkable standard. Parliament has the authority to determine what “five more recent terms” means under the Constitution.

Conclusion: Parliament had the power to specify that President Wee’s last term was the first term in the five term count. The court dismissed the appeal.

Legal Issue(s)

Candidate Registration

Region: Asia-Pacific

Country: Singapore

Language of Decision

English

Court: Appellate Court

Election Type: Presidential

Date of decision: Aug 23, 2017

Geolocation

Latitude: 1.289765826

Longitude: 103.8511735

: Geolocation

Primary Documents

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Election Judgments - IFES

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Tan Chen Bock v. Attorney General

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