Tan Cheng Bock v AG 47 [2017] SGCA 50 In Ting Choon Meng, the three situations under which the court may consider extraneous material as set out under s 9A(2) were outlined as follows (at [65]): (a) Under s 9A(2)(a), to confirm that the ordinary meaning deduced is the correct and intended meaning having regard to any extraneous material that further elucidates the purpose or object of the written law; (b) Under s 9A(2)(b)(i), to ascertain the meaning of the text in question when the provision on its face is ambiguous or obscure; and (c) Under s 9A(2)(b)(ii), to ascertain the meaning of the text in question where having deduced the ordinary meaning of the text as aforesaid, and considering the underlying object and purpose of the written law, such ordinary meaning is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 48 It may be asked, if extraneous material is being considered under s 9A(2)(a), whether there is a real point to considering such material. If the extraneous material does not confirm the ordinary meaning – or even calls that ordinary meaning into question – the court is not permitted to use that extraneous material as a basis for departing from the ordinary meaning, as that is only permissible when reference is made under s 9A(2)(b). If instead the extraneous material does confirm the ordinary meaning, that too would not alter the result: the court would have had to apply the ordinary meaning in any event since s 9A(2)(b) was not invoked. It may seem from this that there is no point in referring to the extraneous material either way. 49 In our judgment, the explanation for this is a practical one: even though extraneous material referred to under s 9A(2)(a) alone cannot alter the outcome 24