20 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N v. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE
Opinion of the Court
candidate’s debt could only arguably enrich the candidate if
the candidate does not otherwise expect to be repaid. In
other words, the Government’s gift comparison is meaningful only if the baseline is that the campaign will default.
The Government, however, provides no reason to believe
that most or even many winning candidates—the only candidates with whom its anticorruption interest is concerned—expect not to be repaid by their campaigns. To the
contrary, the Government has recognized throughout this
litigation that winning candidates are commonly repaid in
full. See App. 31–32 (citing the former FEC Commissioner’s statement that “only winners have an easy time
dealing with debt”); id., at 317 (same); see also Ovtchinnikov, Self-Funding 11 (concluding that, even with BCRA’s
limitations on loan repayment in place, two out of three
winning campaigns were able to repay a candidate’s loans
in full). For such a candidate, then, post-election contributions bear little resemblance to a gift, because there is less
of a chance that his campaign will default. Such contributions instead restore the candidate to the status quo ante,
a position to which he legitimately expected to return. As
for losing candidates, they are of course in no position to
grant official favors, and the Government does not provide
any anticorruption rationale to explain why post-election
contributions to those candidates should be restricted. See
Brief for Appellant 45–46.
The analogy also proves too much. By the Government’s
logic, post-election contributions to retire candidate loans
are little different from gifts given directly to the candidate.
But that logic is belied by how the Government treats the
two categories of purported “gifts.” On the one hand, federal law flatly prohibits candidates from using campaign
contributions for personal purposes. See 52 U. S. C.
§30114(b)(2). And it forbids Senators from accepting gifts
worth $250 or more. See 2 U. S. C. §4725(a)(1). By contrast, the postulated “gift-by-loan-repayment” limits are