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Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 21 Opinion of the Court simply the individual contribution limits, which are now more than ten times higher than the gift limit: $2,900 per election. And Section 304 allows over 86 such “gifts” before a campaign hits the Act’s $250,000 cap. Either the Government is openly tolerating a significant number of “gifts” far more generous than what it would normally think fit to allow, or post-election contributions that go toward retiring campaign debt are in no real sense “gifts” to a candidate. We find the latter answer more persuasive. As a final argument, the Government claims that if the matter is otherwise in doubt, we should defer to Congress’s “legislative judgment” that Section 304 furthers an anticorruption goal. Brief for Appellant 39; see also post, at 8 (KAGAN, J., dissenting) (also arguing that we have no “reason to second-guess Congress’s experience-based judgment”). Such deference, the Government contends, is grounded “in part on the understanding that Congress ‘is far better equipped than the judiciary to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing upon legislative questions.’ ” Brief for Appellant 40 (quoting Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U. S. 180, 195 (1997) (some internal quotation marks omitted)). But as explained, the evidence here is scant, and Congress’s judgment is hardly based on “vast amounts of data.” Id., at 195. Moreover, deference to Congress would be especially inappropriate where, as here, the legislative act may have been an effort to “insulate[ ] legislators from effective electoral challenge.” Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S., at 404 (BREYER, J., concurring); see also Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U. S. 230, 248–249 (2006) (plurality opinion). In the end, it remains our role to decide whether a particular legislative choice is constitutional. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 129 (1989); see also Randall, 548 U. S., at 248–249 (stressing need for “the exercise of independent judicial judgment” in case raising concern that “contribution limits that are too low [may]

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Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate

Judgment

Question Presented: Whether Section 304 of BCRA — which limits the amount of post-election contributions that a campaign may use to repay a candidate's personal loans to the campaign — violated the First Amendment by burdening core political speech. The specific question was whether the Government could demonstrate that the loan-repayment limitation was "closely drawn" to a sufficiently important interest — namely, preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance — given that the limitation deters candidates from loaning money to their campaigns by increasing the risk that such loans will not be fully repaid.

Alleged Acts: Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002 amended FECA to limit the amount of post-election contributions that a campaign could use to repay a candidate's personal loans to his or her own campaign. Specifically, Section 304 capped at $250,000 the total amount of post-election contributions that could be used to repay candidate loans made before the election. 52 U.S.C. § 30116(j). Any loan amount above $250,000 could not be repaid using post-election contributions. In 2018, Senator Ted Cruz loaned his Senate campaign committee ("Ted Cruz for Senate") $260,000 — $10,000 above the $250,000 repayment cap. After the election, the campaign received post-election contributions sufficient to repay the full loan. However, because of Section 304's $250,000 cap, the campaign could only repay $250,000 of the loan from post-election contributions, leaving $10,000 unreimbursed. Senator Cruz and his campaign committee sued the FEC, arguing that Section 304's loan-repayment limitation violated the First Amendment by burdening candidates' ability to loan money to their own campaigns.

Procedural history: The district court granted summary judgment for Senator Cruz, holding that Section 304's loan-repayment limit violated the First Amendment because it burdened political speech and the Government had failed to demonstrate that the limit served an interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or was sufficiently tailored.

Summary: Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate is a significant campaign finance decision in which the Supreme Court struck down Section 304 of BCRA, which limited to $250,000 the amount of post-election contributions a campaign could use to repay a candidate's personal loans. The Court held that the provision violated the First Amendment because it burdened core political speech — by deterring candidates from loaning money to their own campaigns — without sufficient justification. Applying the "closely drawn" scrutiny standard, the Court found that the Government had failed to demonstrate that the loan-repayment limitation was "necessary" to prevent quid pro quo corruption, especially given that existing base contribution limits already constrained the amount any single donor could contribute to a campaign. The decision reinforced the Court's narrow definition of the permissible government interest in campaign finance regulation — limited to preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance — and the requirement that any speech-restrictive measure be "necessary," "narrowly tailored," and not "disproportionate." Cruz has been cited as a key precedent in subsequent campaign finance cases, including NRSC v. FEC (2026), which relied on Cruz's articulation of the rigorous "closely drawn" standard and its methodology of looking to the experience of the States to assess whether a particular campaign finance restriction is necessary.

Conclusion: In a 6–3 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court and held that Section 304 of BCRA violates the First Amendment. The Court held that Section 304 burdens core political speech by restricting the sources of funds that campaigns may use to repay candidate loans, thereby increasing the risk that such loans will not be repaid and deterring candidates from self-funding through loans in the first place. The Court applied the "closely drawn" scrutiny standard — the test used for contribution limits under Buckley and McCutcheon. Under this standard, a regulation must be "closely drawn" to a "sufficiently important interest" and may not be "disproportionate" or go beyond what is "necessary" to achieve the government's goal. The Court held that the Government had failed to demonstrate that Section 304's loan-repayment limitation furthers a permissible anti-corruption interest. The Government argued that the limitation prevents quid pro quo corruption by reducing the risk that a newly elected candidate would accept post-election contributions in exchange for official favors, with the contributions used to repay the candidate's personal loans. The Court found this rationale inadequate. The Court noted that existing contribution limits already prevented donors from giving more than the statutory maximum to the campaign, whether before or after the election. The loan-repayment limitation was therefore not "necessary" because the base contribution limits already served the anti-corruption interest, and the Government had not shown why an additional restriction on the source of repayment funds was needed.

Legal Issue(s)

Campaign Finance

Applicable Law(s): Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, Federal Election Campaign Act, and the First Amendment of the United States Constitution

Region: Americas

Country: United States of America

Language of Decision

English

Court: Supreme Court

Election Type: General

Date of decision: May 16, 2022

Geolocation

Latitude: 38.890591

Longitude: -77.004745

: Geolocation

Link: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/21-12_m6hn.pdf

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FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION v. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE.pdf
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Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate

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