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Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 3 Syllabus campaign—to repay Cruz’s loans. Ordinarily, it would not matter whether a plaintiff was challenging the statute’s enforcement or instead the enforcement of a regulation. Here, however, the parties assume that the distinction makes a difference because the subject-matter jurisdiction of the three-judge District Court is limited to actions challenging the enforcement of the statute. See BRCA §304(a). Even under the Government’s account, the present inability of the Committee to repay and Cruz to recover the final $10,000 is traceable to the operation of Section 304 itself. An agency’s regulation cannot “operate independently of” the statute that authorized it. California v. Texas, 593 U. S. ___, ___. Here, the FEC’s 20-day rule was expressly promulgated to implement Section 304. Thus, if Section 304 is invalid and unenforceable, the agency’s 20-day rule is as well, and the remedy appellees sought in the District Court would redress appellees’ harm by preventing enforcement of the agency’s 20-day rule. See Lujan, 504 U. S., at 561. In challenging the FEC’s threatened enforcement of the loan-repayment limitation, through its implementing regulation, appellees may raise constitutional claims against Section 304, the statutory provision that, through the agency’s regulation, is being enforced. Cf. Collins v. Yellen, 594 U. S. ___, ___–___. And because they are challenging “the constitutionality of [a] provision of [BCRA],” §403(a), jurisdiction was proper in the three-judge District Court. Pp. 6–10. 2. Section 304 of BCRA burdens core political speech without proper justification. Pp. 10–22. (a) The loan-repayment limitation abridges First Amendment rights by burdening candidates who wish to make expenditures on behalf of their own candidacy through personal loans. Restricting the sources of funds that campaigns may use to repay candidate loans increases the risk that such loans will not be repaid in full, which, in turn, deters candidates from loaning money to their campaigns. This burden is no small matter. Debt is a ubiquitous tool for financing electoral campaigns, especially for new candidates and challengers. By inhibiting a candidate from using this critical source of campaign funding, Section 304 raises a barrier to entry—thus abridging political speech. Pp. 10–13. (b) The Government has not demonstrated that the loan-repayment limitation furthers a permissible goal. Any law that burdens First Amendment freedoms, even slightly, must be justified by a permissible interest. Pp. 13–22. (i) The only permissible ground for restricting political speech recognized by this Court is the prevention of “quid pro quo” corruption or its appearance. See McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n, 572 U. S. 185, 207. Here, the Government argues that the contributions at issue raise a heightened risk of corruption because they are used to

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Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate

Judgment

Question Presented: Whether Section 304 of BCRA — which limits the amount of post-election contributions that a campaign may use to repay a candidate's personal loans to the campaign — violated the First Amendment by burdening core political speech. The specific question was whether the Government could demonstrate that the loan-repayment limitation was "closely drawn" to a sufficiently important interest — namely, preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance — given that the limitation deters candidates from loaning money to their campaigns by increasing the risk that such loans will not be fully repaid.

Alleged Acts: Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002 amended FECA to limit the amount of post-election contributions that a campaign could use to repay a candidate's personal loans to his or her own campaign. Specifically, Section 304 capped at $250,000 the total amount of post-election contributions that could be used to repay candidate loans made before the election. 52 U.S.C. § 30116(j). Any loan amount above $250,000 could not be repaid using post-election contributions. In 2018, Senator Ted Cruz loaned his Senate campaign committee ("Ted Cruz for Senate") $260,000 — $10,000 above the $250,000 repayment cap. After the election, the campaign received post-election contributions sufficient to repay the full loan. However, because of Section 304's $250,000 cap, the campaign could only repay $250,000 of the loan from post-election contributions, leaving $10,000 unreimbursed. Senator Cruz and his campaign committee sued the FEC, arguing that Section 304's loan-repayment limitation violated the First Amendment by burdening candidates' ability to loan money to their own campaigns.

Procedural history: The district court granted summary judgment for Senator Cruz, holding that Section 304's loan-repayment limit violated the First Amendment because it burdened political speech and the Government had failed to demonstrate that the limit served an interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or was sufficiently tailored.

Summary: Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate is a significant campaign finance decision in which the Supreme Court struck down Section 304 of BCRA, which limited to $250,000 the amount of post-election contributions a campaign could use to repay a candidate's personal loans. The Court held that the provision violated the First Amendment because it burdened core political speech — by deterring candidates from loaning money to their own campaigns — without sufficient justification. Applying the "closely drawn" scrutiny standard, the Court found that the Government had failed to demonstrate that the loan-repayment limitation was "necessary" to prevent quid pro quo corruption, especially given that existing base contribution limits already constrained the amount any single donor could contribute to a campaign. The decision reinforced the Court's narrow definition of the permissible government interest in campaign finance regulation — limited to preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance — and the requirement that any speech-restrictive measure be "necessary," "narrowly tailored," and not "disproportionate." Cruz has been cited as a key precedent in subsequent campaign finance cases, including NRSC v. FEC (2026), which relied on Cruz's articulation of the rigorous "closely drawn" standard and its methodology of looking to the experience of the States to assess whether a particular campaign finance restriction is necessary.

Conclusion: In a 6–3 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court and held that Section 304 of BCRA violates the First Amendment. The Court held that Section 304 burdens core political speech by restricting the sources of funds that campaigns may use to repay candidate loans, thereby increasing the risk that such loans will not be repaid and deterring candidates from self-funding through loans in the first place. The Court applied the "closely drawn" scrutiny standard — the test used for contribution limits under Buckley and McCutcheon. Under this standard, a regulation must be "closely drawn" to a "sufficiently important interest" and may not be "disproportionate" or go beyond what is "necessary" to achieve the government's goal. The Court held that the Government had failed to demonstrate that Section 304's loan-repayment limitation furthers a permissible anti-corruption interest. The Government argued that the limitation prevents quid pro quo corruption by reducing the risk that a newly elected candidate would accept post-election contributions in exchange for official favors, with the contributions used to repay the candidate's personal loans. The Court found this rationale inadequate. The Court noted that existing contribution limits already prevented donors from giving more than the statutory maximum to the campaign, whether before or after the election. The loan-repayment limitation was therefore not "necessary" because the base contribution limits already served the anti-corruption interest, and the Government had not shown why an additional restriction on the source of repayment funds was needed.

Legal Issue(s)

Campaign Finance

Applicable Law(s): Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, Federal Election Campaign Act, and the First Amendment of the United States Constitution

Region: Americas

Country: United States of America

Language of Decision

English

Court: Supreme Court

Election Type: General

Date of decision: May 16, 2022

Geolocation

Latitude: 38.890591

Longitude: -77.004745

: Geolocation

Link: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/21-12_m6hn.pdf

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FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION v. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE.pdf
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Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate

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