INCAL JUDGMENT OF 9 JUNE 1998 22 “In the determination of … any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing … by an independent and impartial tribunal…” He submitted that the National Security Court was not an “independent and impartial tribunal”; as to the Court of Cassation, it had not respected the principle of adversarial procedure or equality of arms and had not held a hearing. The Government rejected this argument, whereas the Commission accepted it, except for that part which related to the lack of a public hearing. A. The proceedings in the National Security Court 1. Arguments of the participants (a) The applicant 62. Mr Incal submitted that the İzmir National Security Court could not be regarded as an “independent and impartial tribunal” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1. The military judge who sat in it was dependent on the executive and, more specifically, on the military authorities, because while performing his judicial duties he remained an officer and maintained his links with the armed forces and his hierarchical superiors. The latter retained the power to influence his career by means of the assessment reports they drew up on him. Mr Incal maintained that the National Security Courts were special courts set up to protect the State’s interests rather than to do justice as such; in that respect their function was similar to that of the executive. The presence of a military judge in the court’s composition only served to confirm the army’s authority and its intimidating influence over both the defendant and public opinion in general. The fact that a military judge was able to pass judgment on a civilian, and a politician at that, in connection with an offence that had nothing to do with military justice, evidenced the armed forces’ influence over the handling of Turkey’s political problems. (b) The Government 63. The Government submitted that the procedure for the appointment of the military judges sitting as members of the National Security Courts and the safeguards they enjoyed in the performance of their judicial duties perfectly satisfied the criteria laid down by the Court’s case-law on the subject. The arguments concerning these judges’ responsibility towards their commanding officers and the rules governing their professional assessment were overstated; their duties as officers were limited to obeying military regulations and observing military courtesies. They were safe from any