Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 13 Opinion of the Court In short, under the Court’s more recent First Amendment precedents, the Government’s desire to prevent or reduce influence, ingratiation, gratitude, access, or the like for those who spend in support of, or contribute to, political parties or candidates is not a constitutionally permissible objective for campaign finance restrictions. Therefore, the political-party coordinated-expenditure limits can no longer be justified on that basis. Fourth, the Colorado II decision also rested on an anticircumvention rationale. The anti-circumvention theory goes like this: An individual donor who wants to engage in quid pro quo corruption—that is, donate to a candidate in exchange for official action by that candidate when in office—might give a candidate’s political party large contributions above the existing limits on contributions to candidates. And the party might then spend that money in coordination with the candidate in order to support that candidate’s campaign. Colorado II concluded that the political-party coordinated-expenditure limits help prevent such circumvention of the contribution limits. 533 U. S., at 457. But this Court has since retreated from that rationale. As the Court later emphasized in McCutcheon, that kind of purported circumvention is one significant step removed from actual quid pro quo corruption—that is, from a donor’s contribution to a candidate in exchange for official action. That is because the donor gives money to a political party, not to the candidate. That distinction is significant: McCutcheon recognized that there “is not the same risk of quid pro quo corruption . . . when money flows through independent actors to a candidate, as when a donor contributes to a candidate directly.” 572 U. S., at 210. After the donor has contributed to the party, the party is legally and practically free to use the funds as it sees fit— presumably supporting the candidates who have the best chance of success, are locked in the closest races, or align