18 NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N Opinion of the Court enough to override the First Amendment and justify limits on political party speech. Amicus and intervenors also assert that the earmarking rules are often toothless because “violations are essentially impossible to discover and prove.” Brief for CourtAppointed Amicus Curiae 44. But there is no good reason to think that the Government cannot detect a donor who tries to make a disguised large contribution to a particular candidate by funneling it through a contribution to a party. See Reply Brief for Federal Respondents 18–19. Especially given the companion disclosure requirements, those kinds of contributions will be easy enough for the Government to identify and, if warranted, investigate as possible earmarks. Moreover, to the extent that amicus and intervenors are suggesting that earmarking rules go unenforced or underenforced, that problem primarily is one of sufficient investigative resources and enforcement priorities by the Executive Branch. But a purported lack of Government (Executive) enforcement of campaign finance restrictions is not an excuse for the Government (Congress and the Executive) to turn around and enact legislation that would broadly suppress speech and sweep aside the First Amendment. As JUSTICE THOMAS explained: “Vigilant enforcement” of the earmarking rules is a more “precise response” by the Government to any “circumvention concerns.” Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 481 (dissenting opinion). For those reasons, McCutcheon relied on the earmarking rule in explaining why the aggregate contribution limits at issue there were unnecessary to prevent circumvention. 572 U. S., at 201–202, 210–212, 215, 222–223. So too here. With regard to the disclosure rules, amicus and intervenors question whether they are a sufficient substitute for political-party coordinated-expenditure limits. But as McCutcheon outlined, modern technology