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Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 3 Syllabus circumvention—in particular, earmarking and disclosure laws. With respect to earmarking laws: FECA treats an individual’s contributions to a party that are “in any way earmarked or otherwise directed through an intermediary or conduit” to a federal candidate “as contributions from such person to such candidate”—and thus subject to the limits on contributions to candidates. 52 U. S. C. §30116(a)(8). In McCutcheon, the Court explained that such earmarking rules constitute a targeted and constitutionally permissible way for the Government to prohibit circumvention of the base limits on contributions to candidates. 572 U. S., at 222–223. As JUSTICE THOMAS has explained: “Vigilant enforcement” of the earmarking rules is a more “precise response” by the Government to any “circumvention concerns.” Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 481 (dissenting opinion). With respect to disclosure laws: FECA requires that political parties and candidates publicly disclose both the contributions they receive and their spending on campaign activities, including on coordinated expenditures. §30104(b). As the Court emphasized in McCutcheon, disclosure has become a much stronger anti-circumvention tool over time because of “modern technology,” especially the Internet. 572 U. S., at 224. Importantly, it is the combination of the base contribution limits plus the earmarking rules plus the disclosure requirements together that serve the Government’s anti-circumvention interests here—without unduly restricting core political party speech. Given the meaningful prophylactic measures available to combat quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, the Court concludes that the political-party coordinated-expenditure limits at issue here are “disproportionate” and are not “necessary” and “narrowly tailored” for the circumvention interest. Id., at 199, 218, 220 (quotation marks omitted); Cruz, 596 U. S., at 306. Pp. 10–21. (c) Amicus and intervenors contend that the Court should adhere to Colorado II as a matter of stare decisis, but Colorado II ’s reasoning has been rejected by the Court’s more recent precedents and is no longer good law. To the extent that Colorado II has retained any vitality, it is now overruled. Pp. 21–26. 117 F. 4th 389, reversed and remanded. KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, GORSUCH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. KAGAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR and JACKSON, JJ., joined.

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National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission

Judgment

Question Presented: Whether FECA's limits on political parties' coordinated expenditures with candidates violate the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech, and specifically whether Colorado II—which upheld those limits under a deferential standard of review—remains good law in light of the Court's subsequent, more demanding campaign finance jurisprudence requiring that restrictions be "necessary," "narrowly tailored," and not "disproportionate" to the government's interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption.

Alleged Acts: The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) imposes limits on the amount a political party may spend in coordination with its candidates during political campaigns—known as "coordinated-expenditure limits." 52 U.S.C. §30116(d). These limits vary by office: for Senate candidates, the national party committee may spend between $130,600 and $4,071,800; for House candidates, between $65,300 and $130,600; and for Presidential candidates, up to $32,392,200. In 2022, the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC), the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC), then-candidate for Senate JD Vance, and then-Representative Steve Chabot sued the FEC, arguing that these limits violate the First Amendment. They contend that FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. (Colorado II), 533 U.S. 431 (2001)—which upheld the limits—is no longer good law in light of the Court's more recent campaign finance decisions, particularly McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014), and FEC v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U.S. 289 (2022). Notably, the United States (Executive Branch) agreed with plaintiffs that the limits are no longer constitutional, declining to defend them.

Procedural history: The en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' challenge and upheld FECA's coordinated-expenditure limits, applying Colorado II. However, a majority of the Sixth Circuit judges questioned Colorado II's continued vitality.

Summary: National Republican Senatorial Committee v. FEC is a landmark First Amendment campaign finance decision in which the Supreme Court struck down FECA's limits on political-party coordinated expenditures as unconstitutional. Writing for the 6–3 majority, Justice Kavanaugh held that existing base contribution limits, earmarking rules, and disclosure requirements together provide sufficient protection against quid pro quo corruption, making the additional coordinated-expenditure limits "disproportionate" and not "narrowly tailored." The Court formally overruled Colorado II (2001), finding its reasoning had been thoroughly undermined by subsequent precedents, particularly McCutcheon and Cruz. The dissent, authored by Justice Kagan, argued that without the caps, donors could circumvent base contribution limits by funneling large contributions through political parties to candidates, thereby reviving opportunities for quid pro quo corruption. The decision applies equally to all political parties and removes a significant regulatory constraint on party-candidate coordination.

Conclusion: In a 6–3 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and held that FECA's political-party coordinated-expenditure limits violate the First Amendment. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett. The Court concluded that the combination of (i) base contribution limits, (ii) earmarking rules (52 U.S.C. §30116(a)(8)), and (iii) disclosure requirements (52 U.S.C. §30104(b)) already serve as three sufficient prophylactic measures against quid pro quo corruption. The coordinated-expenditure limits would operate as a "fourth prophylaxis" that is "disproportionate" and not "necessary" given the less-speech-restrictive alternatives. The Court also noted that a majority of States do not impose similar limits on party coordinated expenditures, and no evidence of resulting corruption has materialized.

Legal Issue(s)

Campaign Finance
Conflict of Interests

Applicable Law(s): First Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Federal Election Campaign Act

Region: Americas

Country: United States of America

Language of Decision

English

Court: Supreme Court

Election Type: General

Date of decision: Jun 30, 2026

Geolocation

Latitude: 38.8906

Longitude: -77.0047

: Geolocation

Link: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-621_h315.pdf

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National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission.pdf
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National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission

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