4
NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE v.
FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
KAGAN, J., dissenting
bigger, the better. To get large contributions, they may be
willing to return public-policy concessions—a decision or a
vote on some matter of governance. And even when that
does not occur, the public can see that it might—that the
incentives and opportunities are there for buying and selling policy outcomes. So Congress set strict base limits to
protect both “the integrity of ” and public “confidence in” our
“system of representative Government.” Id., at 26–27. In
1974, the limit was $1,000 per election. See id., at 26. Today, that limit is $3,500—or $7,000 if you count the primary
and general elections together. See FEC, Contribution
Limits for 2025–2026 (Jan. 30, 2025) (https://perma.cc/
57Q5-PYKG).
This Court has long recognized that those base limits
comply with the First Amendment. Preventing quid pro
quo corruption and its appearance is an important—indeed,
a “compelling”—government interest. McCutcheon, 572
U. S., at 199; see Buckley, 424 U. S., at 25–27. And the base
limits are “closely drawn” to further that interest. Id., at
25. They “focus[ ] precisely on the problem of large campaign contributions,” while leaving supporters of candidates free to engage in other political activity (including
small donations). Id., at 28. The limits thus target the “aspect” of political life most capable of creating “the actuality
and potential for corruption.” Ibid.
And to protect the base limits from easy evasion, the
Court has recognized, further regulations may also be permissible.
See McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 222–223;
McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93, 171–
173 (2003); Buckley, 424 U. S., at 46–47. Again, the idea is
straightforward. If a donor can circumvent the base limits
through some type of routing mechanism, the limits will
lose all their efficacy: They will become unable to prevent
actual and apparent quid pro quo corruption. So to the extent that a campaign finance law is appropriately “tailored
to the Government’s interest in preventing circumvention
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