26 NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N Opinion of the Court commands adherence to an egregiously wrong precedent. More speech is generally better than less speech. The bottom line: Colorado II’s reasoning has been rejected by subsequent cases and is no longer good law in light of the Court’s more recent precedents. To the extent that Colorado II has retained any vitality, it is now overruled.6 V In response to the thoughtful dissent, two main points: First, debates over the First Amendment and campaign finance have arisen often over the last 50 years. We recognize that at least two of the dissenters have not agreed with some of the Court’s decisions in that area. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm’n v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U. S. 289, 314 (2022) (KAGAN, J., dissenting); McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n, 572 U. S. 185, 232 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U. S. 310, 393 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Today, we have endeavored to follow the principles laid down in the Court’s decisions. In doing so, moreover, we have concluded that Colorado II is (in our view) an outlier that is not consistent with those precedents. See 533 U. S. 431 (2001). The dissent focuses, in particular, on the operations of joint fundraising committees—the apparent concern being that a donor could write a large check to a joint committee that would then be funneled to the candidate. See post, at 7–12, 15–18 (opinion of KAGAN, J.). But McCutcheon rejected a similar circumvention argument, and its —————— 6 To be clear, the Court’s decision does not address the statutory limits on coordinated expenditures by outside groups. As the Government explained at oral argument, political parties possess an especially strong First Amendment interest in working together with their candidates and making expenditures on political speech in coordination with their candidates. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 65–66.