531US1 124 Unit: $$U9 [05-01-02 10:02:37] PAGES PGT: OPIN BUSH v. GORE Stevens, J., dissenting suant to Article V of the Florida Constitution, and nothing in Article II of the Federal Constitution frees the state legislature from the constraints in the State Constitution that created it. Moreover, the Florida Legislature’s own decision to employ a unitary code for all elections indicates that it intended the Florida Supreme Court to play the same role in Presidential elections that it has historically played in resolving electoral disputes. The Florida Supreme Court’s exercise of appellate jurisdiction therefore was wholly consistent with, and indeed contemplated by, the grant of authority in Article II. It hardly needs stating that Congress, pursuant to 3 U. S. C. § 5, did not impose any affirmative duties upon the States that their governmental branches could “violate.” Rather, § 5 provides a safe harbor for States to select electors in contested elections “by judicial or other methods” established by laws prior to the election day. Section 5, like Article II, assumes the involvement of the state judiciary in interpreting state election laws and resolving election disputes under those laws. Neither § 5 nor Article II grants federal judges any special authority to substitute their views for those of the state judiciary on matters of state law. Nor are petitioners correct in asserting that the failure of the Florida Supreme Court to specify in detail the precise manner in which the “intent of the voter,” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 101.5614(5) (Supp. 2001), is to be determined rises to the level of a constitutional violation.2 We found such a viola2 The Florida statutory standard is consistent with the practice of the majority of States, which apply either an “intent of the voter” standard or an “impossible to determine the elector’s choice” standard in ballot recounts. The following States use an “intent of the voter” standard: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16–645(A) (Supp. 2000) (standard for canvassing write-in votes); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9–150a( j) (1999) (standard for absentee ballots, including three conclusive presumptions); Ind. Code § 3–12–1–1 (1992); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 21–A, § 1(13) (1993); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 33, § 11–302(d) (2000 Supp.) (standard for absentee ballots); Mass. Gen. Laws § 70E (1991) (applying standard to Presidential primaries); Mich.