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[05-01-02 10:02:37] PAGES PGT: OPIN
Cite as: 531 U. S. 98 (2000)
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Stevens, J., dissenting
tion when individual votes within the same State were
weighted unequally, see, e. g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S.
533, 568 (1964), but we have never before called into question
the substantive standard by which a State determines that
a vote has been legally cast. And there is no reason to think
that the guidance provided to the factfinders, specifically the
various canvassing boards, by the “intent of the voter”
standard is any less sufficient—or will lead to results any
less uniform—than, for example, the “beyond a reasonable
doubt” standard employed every day by ordinary citizens in
courtrooms across this country.3
Comp. Laws § 168.799a(3) (Supp. 2000); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 115.453(3) (Cum.
Supp. 1998) (looking to voter’s intent where there is substantial compliance with statutory requirements); Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 65.009(c) (1986);
Utah Code Ann. § 20A–4–104(5)(b) (Supp. 2000) (standard for write-in
votes), § 20A–4–105(6)(a) (standard for mechanical ballots); Vt. Stat. Ann.,
Tit. 17, § 2587(a) (1982); Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–644(A) (2000); Wash. Rev.
Code § 29.62.180(1) (Supp. 2001) (standard for write-in votes); Wyo. Stat.
Ann. § 22–14–104 (1999). The following States employ a standard in
which a vote is counted unless it is “impossible to determine the elector’s
[or voter’s] choice”: Ala. Code § 11–46–44(c) (1992), Ala. Code § 17–13–2
(1995); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16–610 (1996) (standard for rejecting ballot);
Cal. Elec. Code Ann. § 15154(c) (West Supp. 2000); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1–7–
309(1) (1999) (standard for paper ballots), § 1–7–508(2) (standard for electronic ballots); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 15, § 4972(4) (1999); Idaho Code § 34–
1203 (1981); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 10, § 5/7–51 (1993) (standard for primaries), § 5/17–16 (standard for general elections); Iowa Code § 49.98 (1999);
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 21–A §§ 696(2)(B), (4) (Supp. 2000); Minn.
Stat. § 204C.22(1) (1992); Mont. Code Ann. § 13–15–202 (1997) (not counting votes if “elector’s choice cannot be determined”); Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 293.367(d) (1995); N. Y. Elec. Law § 9–112(6) (McKinney 1998); N. C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 163–169(b), 163–170 (1999); N. D. Cent. Code § 16.1–15–01(1) (Supp.
1999); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3505.28 (1994); Okla. Stat., Tit. 26, § 7–127(6)
(1997); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 254.505(1) (1991); S. C. Code Ann. § 7–13–1120
(1977); S. D. Codified Laws § 12–20–7 (1995); Tenn. Code Ann. § 2–7–133(b)
(1994); W. Va. Code § 3–6–5(g) (1999).
3
Cf. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U. S. 1, 5 (1994) (“The beyond a reasonable
doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires
them to do so”).