531US1 Unit: $$U9 [05-01-02 10:02:37] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 531 U. S. 98 (2000) 113 Rehnquist, C. J., concurring the text of the election law itself, and not just its interpretation by the courts of the States, takes on independent significance. In McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1 (1892), we explained that Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, “convey[s] the broadest power of determination” and “leaves it to the legislature exclusively to define the method” of appointment. 146 U. S., at 27. A significant departure from the legislative scheme for appointing Presidential electors presents a federal constitutional question. Title 3 U. S. C. § 5 informs our application of Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, to the Florida statutory scheme, which, as the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged, took that statute into account. Section 5 provides that the State’s selection of electors “shall be conclusive, and shall govern in the counting of the electoral votes” if the electors are chosen under laws enacted prior to election day, and if the selection process is completed six days prior to the meeting of the electoral college. As we noted in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., ante, at 78: “Since § 5 contains a principle of federal law that would assure finality of the State’s determination if made pursuant to a state law in effect before the election, a legislative wish to take advantage of the ‘safe harbor’ would counsel against any construction of the Election Code that Congress might deem to be a change in the law.” If we are to respect the legislature’s Article II powers, therefore, we must ensure that postelection state-court actions do not frustrate the legislative desire to attain the “safe harbor” provided by § 5. In Florida, the legislature has chosen to hold statewide elections to appoint the State’s 25 electors. Importantly, the legislature has delegated the authority to run the elections and to oversee election disputes to the Secretary of