BUCKLEY v. VALEO Per Curiam Finally, appellants challenge the validity of the 5% threshold requirement for general election funding. They argue that, since most state regulations governing ballot access have threshold requirements well below 5%, and because in their view the 5% requirement here is actually stricter than that upheld in Jenness v. Fortson,403 U. S. 431 (1971), 39 the requirement is unreasonable. We have already concluded that the restriction under Chapter 95 is generally less burdensome than ballot-access regulations. Supra, at 94-95. Further, the Georgia provision sustained in Jenness required the candidate to obtain the signatures of 5% of all eligible voters, without regard to party. To be sure, the public funding formula does not permit anyone who voted for another party in the last election to be part of a candidate's 5%. But under Chapter 95 a Presidential candidate needs only 5% or more of the actual vote, not the larger universe of eligible voters. As a result, we cannot say that Chapter 95 is numerically more, or less, restrictive than the regulation in Jenness. In any event, the choice of the percentage requirement that best accommodates the competing interests involved was for Congress to make. See Louisville Gas Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32, 41 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting); n. 111, supra. Without any doubt a range of formulations would sufficiently protect the public fise and not foster factionalism, and would also recognize the public interest in the fluidity of our political 139 It is also argued that Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S. 724 (1974), is a better analogy than Jenness. In Storer a candidate could qualify for the ballot by obtaining the signatures of 5% of the voters, but the signatures could not include any voters who voted for another candidate at the primary election. 415 U. S., at 739. The analogy, however, i~sno better than Jenness. The Chapter 95 formula is not more restrictive than that sustained in the two cases, since for the reasons stated earlier, supra, at 94-95, it burdens minority interests less than ballot-access regulations.