OCTOBER TERM, 1975 Per Curiam 424 U. S. matching funds is acceptance of an expenditure ceiling, and candidates with little fundraising ability will be able to increase their spending relative to candidates capable of raising large amounts in private funds. For the reasons stated, we reject appellants' claims that Subtitle H is facially unconstitutional.' C. Severability The only remaining issuie is whether our holdings invalidating 18 U. S. C. §§ 608 (a), (c), and (e)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV) require the conclusion that Subtitle H is unconstitutional. There is, of course, a relationship between the spending limits in § 608 (c) and the public financing provisions; the expenditure limits accepted by a candidate to be eligible for public funding are identical to the limits in § 608 (c). But we have no difficulty in concluding that Subtitle H is severable. "Unless it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law." Champ147 Our responses to the certified constitutional questions pertaining to public financing of Presidential election campaigns are: 5. Does any statutory prov ision for the public financing of political conventions or campaigns for nomination or election to the Presidency or Vice Presidency violate the rights of one or more of the plaintiffs under the First or Ninth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, or Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, of the Constitution of the United States? Answer: NO. 6. Do the particular provisions of Subtitle H and § 6096 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 deprive one or more of the plaintiffs of such rights under the First or Ninth Amendment or Article 1, Section 8, Clause 1, in that they provide federal tax money to support certain political candidates, parties, movements, and organizations or in the manner that they so provide such federal tax money? Answer: NO.