OCTOBER TERM, 1975 Opinion of BURGER, C. J. 424 U. S. In saying that the lines drawn by Congress are "not wholly without rationality," the Court plainly fails to apply the traditional test: "Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching on our most precious freedoms." AAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 438 (1938). See, e. g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500 (1964); United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967); Lamont v. Postmaster General, supra. The Court's abrupt departure ' from traditional standards is wrong; surely a greater burden rests on Congress than merely to avoid "irrationality" when regulating in the core area of the First Amendment. Even taking the Court at its word, the particular dollar amounts fixed by Congress that must be reported to the Commission fall short of meeting the test of rationality when measured by the goals sought to be achieved. Finally, no legitimate public interest has been shown in forcing the disclosure of modest contributions that are the prime support of new, unpopular, or unfashionable political causes. There is no realistic possibility that such modest donations will have a corrupting influence especially on parties that enjoy only "minor" status. Major parties would not notice them; miner parties need them. Furthermore, as the Court candidly recognizes, ante, at 70, minor parties and new parties tend to be sharply ideological in character, and the public can readily discern where such parties stand, without resorting to the indirect device of recording the names of financial supporters. To hold, as the Court has, that privacy must sometimes yield to congressional investigations of alleged subversion, is quite different from making domestic po3 Ironically, the Court seems to recognize this principle when dealing with the limitations on contributions. Ante, at 25.