BUCKLEY v. VALEO
I
Opinion of BURGFR, C. J.
ment subsidies for political campaigns first was broached,
there has been no lack of realization that the use of funds
from the public treasury to subsidize political activity of
private individuals would produce substantial and profound questions about the nature of our democratic society, The Majority Leader of the Senate, although
supporting such legislation in 1967, said that "the implications of these questions . . .go to the very heart and
structure of the Government of the Republic." 11 The
Solicitor General in his amicus curiae brief states that
"the issues involved here are of indisputable moment." 12
He goes on to express his view that public financing will
have "profound effects in the way candidates approach
issues and each other." '
Public financing, he notes,
"affects the role of the party in campaigns for office,
changes the role of the incumbent government vis-a-vis
all parties, and affects the relative strengths and strategies of candidates vis-a-vis each other and their party's
leaders." 1"
The Court chooses to treat this novel public financing
of political activity as simply another congressional appropriation whose validity is "necessary and proper" to
Congress' power to regulate and reform elections and
primaries, relying on United States v. Classic, 313 U. S
299 (1941), and Burroughs v. United States, 290 U. S.
534 (1934). No holding of this Court is directly in point,
because no federal scheme allocating public funds in a
comparable manner has ever been before us. The uniqueness of the plan is not relevant, of course, to whether
Congress has power to enact it. Indeed, I do not question the power of Congress to regulate elections; nor do I
11113 Cong. Rlec. 12165 (1967).
12 Brief
for Appellee Attorney General and for United States as
Amicus Curiae 93.
13 Id., at 94.
14
Id., at 93.
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