OCTOBER TERM, 1975 Opinion of BURGER, C. J. 424 U. S. little sensitivity to the danger it has so strongly condemned in other contexts. See, e. g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947). Up to now, this Court has scrupulously refrained, absent claims of invidious discrimination," from entering the arena of intraparty disputes concerning the seating of convention delegates. Graham v. Fong Eu, 403 F. Supp. 37 (ND Cal. 1975), summarily aff'd, 423 U. S. 1067 (1976); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U. S. 477 (1975); O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U. S. 1 (1972). An obvious underlying basis for this reluctance is that delegate selection and the management of political conventions have been considered a strictly private political matter, not the business of Government inspectors. But once the Government finances these national conventions by the expenditure of millions of dollars from the public treasury, we may be providing a springboard for later attempts to impose a whole range of requirements on delegate selection and convention activities. Does this foreshadow judicial decisions allowing the federal courts to "monitor" these conventions to assure compliance with court orders or regulations? Assuming, arguendo, that Congress could validly appropriate public money to subsidize private political activity, it has gone about the task in Subtitle H in a manner which is not, in my view, free of constitutional infirmity.19 I do not question that Congress has "wide discretion in the manner of prescribing details of expenditures" in some contexts, Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U. S. 308, 321 (1937). Here, however, Congress has not itself appropriated a specific sum to attain the ends of the Act but has delegated to a limited group 18 Cf. Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944). 19 See generally remarks of Senator Gore, 112 Cong. Rec. 28783 (1966).