OCTOBER TERM, 1975 Opinion of BURGER, C. J. 424 U. S. matching grants which makes a candidate's ability to amass private funds the sole criterion for eligibility for public funds. Such an arrangement can put at serious disadvantage a candidate with a potentially large, widely diffused-but poor-constituency. The ability of a candidate's supporters to help pay for his campaign cannot be equated with their willingness to cast a ballot for him. See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U. S. 709 (1974); Bullock v. Carter,405 U. S.134 (1972). (4) I cannot join in the attempt to determine which parts of the Act can survive review here. The statute as it now stands is unworkable and inequitable. I agree with the Court's holding that the Act's restrictions on expenditures made "relative to a clearly identified candidate," independent of any candidate or his committee, are unconstitutional. Ante, at 39-51. Paradoxically the Court upholds the limitations on individual contributions, which embrace precisely the same sort of expenditures "relative to a clearly identified candidate" if those expenditures are "authorized or requested" by the "candidate or his agents." Ante, at 24 n. 25. The Act as cut back by the Court thus places intolerable pressure on the distinction between "authorized" and "unauthorized" expenditures on behalf of a candidate; even those with the most sanguine hopes for the Act might well concede that the distinction cannot be maintained. As the Senate Report on the bill said: "Whether campaigns are funded privately or publicly ... controls are imperative if Congress is to en- act meaningful limits on direct contributions. Otherwise, wealthy individuals limited to a $3,000 direct contribution [$1,000 in the bill as finally enacted] could also purchase one hundred thousand

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