OCTOBER TERM, 1975 Opinion of BURGER, C. J. 424 U. S. spoken of the broad coverage of the First Amendment, especially in the area of political dialogue: "[T]o assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people," Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 484 (1957); and: "IT]here is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs ... [including] discussions of candidates . .. ," Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214, 218 (1966); and again: "[Ilt can hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee [of the First Amendment) has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office." Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S. 265, 272 (1971). To accept this generalization one need not agree that the Amendment has its "fullest and most urgent application" only in the political area, for others would think religious freedom is on the same or even a higher plane. But I doubt that the Court would tolerate for an instant a limitation on contributions to a church or other religious cause; however grave an "evil" Congress thought the limits would cure, limits on religious expenditures would most certainly fall as well. To limit either contributions or expenditures as to churches would plainly restrict "the free exercise" of religion. In my view Congress can no more ration political expression than it can ration religious expression; and limits on political or religious contributions and expenditures effectively curb expression in both areas. There are many prices we pay for the freedoms secured by the First Amendment; the risk of undue