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BUCKLEY v. VALEO I Per Curiam mate effect is the same as if the person had contributed the dollar amount to the candidate and the candidate had then used the contribution to pay for the fundraising event or the food. Similarly, travel undertaken as a volunteer at the direction of the candidate or his staff is an expense of the campaign and may properly be viewed as a contribution if the volunteer absorbs the fare. Treating these expenses as contributions when made to the candidate's campaign or at the direction of the candidate or his staff forecloses an avenue of abuse 42 without limiting actions voluntarily undertaken by citizens independently of a candidate's campaign. 2 4'2Although expenditures incidental to volunteer services would appear self-limiting, it is possible for a worker in a candidate's campaign to generate substantial travel expenses. An affidavit submitted by Stewart Mott, an appellant, indicates that he "expended some $50,000 for personal expenses" in connection with Senator McGovern's 1972 Presidential campaign. 43 The Act contains identical, parallel provisions pertaining to incidental volunteer expenses under the definitions of contribution and expenditure. Compare §§ 591 (e) (5) (B)-(D) with §§ 591 (f) (4) (D), (E). The definitions have two effects. First, volunteer expenses that are counted as contributions by the volunteer would also constitute expenditures by the candidate's campaign. Second, some volunteer expenses would qualify as contributions whereas others would constitute independent expenditures. The statute distinguishes between independent expenditures by individuals and campaign expenditures on the basis of whether the candidate, an authorized committee of the candidate, or an agent of the candidate "authorized or requested" the expenditure. See §§ 608 (c) (2) (B) (ii), (e) (1) ; S. Rep. No. 93-689, p. 18 (1974); H. R. Rep. No. 93-1239, p. 6 (1974). As a result, only travel that is "authorized or requested" by the candidate or his agents would involve incidental expenses chargeable against the volunteer's contribution limit and the candidate's expenditure ceiling. See n. 53, infra. Should a person independently travel across the country to participate in a campaign, any unreimbursed travel expenses would not be treated as a contribution. This interpretation is not only consistent with the statute

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Buckley v. Valeo

Judgment

Question Presented: Whether the various provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) — including limits on contributions, limits on expenditures (both by candidates and independent spenders), disclosure requirements, the public financing of presidential campaigns, and the structure of the FEC — violated the First Amendment's protection of political speech and association, the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection, and the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. The central question was whether the government's interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption in federal elections could justify restrictions on political spending, and if so, which restrictions.

Alleged Acts: In 1971, Congress enacted the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), and in 1974, it passed amendments that created what the D.C. Circuit described as "by far the most comprehensive reform legislation [ever] passed by Congress concerning the election of the President, Vice-President, and members of Congress." The 1974 amendments contained four imperative components. First, individuals were limited to contributing $1,000 to any single candidate per election, with an overall annual cap of $25,000 per contributor. Second, independent expenditures by individuals and groups "relative to a clearly identified candidate" were limited to $1,000 per year. Campaign spending by candidates for federal offices and spending for national conventions by political parties were also subject to prescribed limits. Third, contributions and expenditures above certain threshold levels had to be reported and publicly disclosed. Fourth, a system for public funding of Presidential campaign activities was established under Subtitle H of the Internal Revenue Code. Finally, a six-member FEC was established to administer and enforce the legislation. A diverse group of plaintiffs — including Senator James Buckley (Conservative Party, NY), presidential candidate Eugene McCarthy, the New York Civil Liberties Union, the American Conservative Union, and others — challenged the constitutionality of these provisions under the First Amendment.

Procedural history: The case was originally filed in the district court. It was heard by a three-judge court, which upheld the legislation in large part. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit sustained the legislation in large part, finding a "compelling governmental interest, both as to need and public perception of need, that justifies any incidental impact on First Amendment freedoms" resulting from the statutory limitations.

Summary: Buckley v. Valeo is the foundational decision of modern American campaign finance law. The Supreme Court established the critical constitutional distinction between contributions and expenditures that has governed all subsequent campaign finance litigation. The Court held that contribution limits impose only a marginal restriction on political speech (since a contribution is a general expression of support, not direct communication) and may be justified by the government's compelling interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption. By contrast, expenditure limits — whether on candidates or independent spenders — impose direct and substantial restraints on the quantity and diversity of political speech and cannot be justified by the anti-corruption interest alone, particularly where independent expenditures lack coordination with the candidate and thus do not give rise to quid pro quo corruption. The Court also upheld disclosure requirements with a limiting construction requiring "express advocacy" (the "magic words" test), upheld voluntary public financing of presidential campaigns, and struck down the FEC's original appointment structure as violating the Appointments Clause. The decision created the framework that would lead to the rise of independent expenditure committees (including what later became known as Super PACs) and shaped every major campaign finance case that followed, including Colorado Republican v. FEC (1996), McConnell v. FEC (2003), Citizens United v. FEC (2010), McCutcheon v. FEC (2014), and FEC v. Cruz (2022).

Conclusion: The Court upheld the $1,000 contribution limit per candidate and the $25,000 annual overall limit, holding that they imposed only a marginal restriction on political speech. The Court reasoned that a contribution serves as a general expression of support but does not communicate the underlying basis for that support — the "quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution." The government's interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption was sufficient to justify this marginal restraint. The Court struck down the limits on independent expenditures ($1,000/year) and candidate expenditure limits, holding that they imposed direct and substantial restraints on the quantity of political speech. The Court upheld the disclosure and reporting requirements, but imposed a limiting construction to avoid vagueness concerns. The Court narrowed the definition of "expenditure" to reach only communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate — the so-called "magic words" test. The "magic words" of express advocacy include terms such as "vote for," "elect," "support," "cast your ballot for," "vote against," "defeat," and "reject." The Court upheld the system of public financing for presidential campaigns, holding that Congress may condition acceptance of public funds on a candidate's agreement to abide by specified expenditure limitations. Because the candidate voluntarily opts into the public financing system, the expenditure limits are not compelled and do not violate the First Amendment. The Court struck down the structure of the FEC as unconstitutional under the Appointments Clause (Article II, § 2, cl. 2). The original FECA provided that two of the six FEC commissioners would be appointed by Congress (one by the President pro tempore of the Senate and one by the Speaker of the House), which violated the constitutional requirement that principal officers be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.

Legal Issue(s)

Campaign Finance

Applicable Law(s): Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Internal Revenue Code, First Amendment, Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, Article II Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution

Region: Americas

Country: United States of America

Language of Decision

English

Court: Supreme Court

Election Type: General

Date of decision: Jan 30, 1976

Geolocation

Latitude: 38.890591

Longitude: -77.004745

: Geolocation

Link: https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep424/usrep424001/usrep424001.pdf

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Buckley v. Valeo

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