BUCKLEY v. VALEO
1
Per Curiam
tions on core First Amendment rights of political
expression.
We find that the governmental interest in preventing
corruption and the appearance of corruption is inadequate to justify § 608 (e) (1)'s ceiling on independent
expenditures. First, assuming, arguendo, that large independent expenditures pose the same dangers of actual
or apparent quid pro quo arrangements as do large contributions, § 608 (e) (1) does not provide an answer that
sufficiently relates to the elimination of those dangers.
Unlike the contribution limitations' total ban on the
giving of large amounts of money to candidates, § 608
(e) (1) prevents only some large expenditures. So long
as persons and groups eschew expenditures that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate, they are free to spend as much as
they want to promote the candidate and his views. The
exacting interpretation of the statutory language necessary to avoid unconstitutional vagueness thus undermines the limitation's effectiveness as a loophole-closing
provision by facilitating circumvention by those seeking
to exert improper influence upon a candidate or officeholder. It would naively underestimate the ingenuity
and resourcefulness of persons and groups desiring to
buy influence to believe that they would have much difficulty devising expenditures that skirted the restriction
on express advocacy of election or defeat but nevertheless benefited the candidate's campaign. Yet no substantial societal interest would be served by a loophole-closing
provision designed to check corruption that permitted
unscrupulous persons and organizations to expend unlimited sums of money in order to obtain improper
influence over candidates for elective office. Cf. Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U. S., at 220.
Second, quite apart from the shortcomings of § 608 (e)
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