OCTOBER TERM, 1975 Per Curiam 424 U. S. if that can be done consistent with the legislature's purpose, to avoid the shoals of vagueness. United States v. Harriss,supra,at 618; United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S., at 45. In enacting the legislation under review Congress addressed broadly the problem of political campaign financing. It wished to promote full disclosure of campaignoriented spending to insure both the reality and the appearance of the purity and openness of the federal election process."' Our task is to construe "for the purpose of . . . influencing," incorporated in § 434 (e) through the definitions of "contributions" and "expenditures," in a manner that precisely furthers this goal. In Part I we discussed what constituted a "contribution" for purposes of the contribution limitations set forth in 18 U. S. C. § 608 (b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV)."0 3 We construed that term to include not only contributions made directly or indirectly to a candidate, political party, or campaign committee, and contributions made to other organizations or individuals but earmarked for political purposes, but also all expenditures placed in cooperation with or with the consent of a candidate, his agents, or an authorized committee of the candidate. The definition of "contribution" in § 431 (e) for disclosure purposes parallels the definition in Title 18 almost word for word, and we construe the former provision as we have the latter. So defined, "contributions" have a sufficiently close relationship to the goals of the Act, for they are connected with a candidate or his campaign. When we attempt to define "expenditure" in a similarly narrow way we encounter line-drawing problems S. Rep. No. 92-96, p. 33 (1971); S. Rep. No. 93-689, pp. 1-2 (1974). 103 See n. 53, supra. 102