BUCKLEY v. VALEO Per Curiam We also reject as without merit appellants' argument that the matching formula favors wealthy voters and candidates. The thrust of the legislation is to reduce financial barriers 145 and to enhance the importance of smaller contributions. 46 Some candidates undoubtedly could raise large sums of money and thus have little need for public funds, but candidates with lesser fundraising capabilities will gain substantial benefits from matching funds. In addition, one eligibility requirement for unreasonable method of measuring a candidate's breadth of support. See supra,at 103-105. 145 The fear that barriers would be reduced too much was one reason for rejecting a matching formula for the general election financing system. See n. 136, supra. 146 By offering a single hypothetical situation, appellants try to prove that the matching formula gives wealthy contributors an advantage. Taxpayers 2-e entitled to a deduction from ordinary income for political contributions up to $100, or $200 on a joint return. § 218. Appellants note that a married couple in the 70% tax bracket could give $500 to a candidate and claim the full deduction allowed by § 218, thus reducing their tax liability by $140. The matching funds increase the effective contribution to $1,000, and the total cost to the contributors is $360. But the appellants have disregarded a myriad of other possibilities. For example, taxpayers also have the option of claiming a tax credit up to $25, or $50 on a joint return, for one-half of their political contributions. § 41. Any married couple could give $100 to a candidate, claim the full $50 credit, and matching thus allows a contribution of $200 at a cost of only $50 to the contributors. Because this example and others involve greater subsidization-75% against 64%-of smaller contributions than is involved in appellants' hypothesis, one cannot say that the matching formula unfairly favors wealthy interests or large contributors. Moreover, the effect noted by appellants diminishes as the size of individual contributions approaches $1,000. Finally, these examples clearly reveal that §§ 41 and 218 afford public subsidies for candidates, but appellants have raised no constitutional challenge to the provisions, either on First or Fifth Amendment grounds.