BUCKLEY v. VALEO 1 Opinion of BURGER, C. J. under this analysis, serves the public right to know. This open-ended approach is the only plausible justification for the otherwise irrationally low ceilings of $10 and $100 for anonymous contributions. The burdens of these low ceilings seem to me obvious, and the Court does not try to question this. With commendable candor, the Court acknowledges: "It is undoubtedly true that public disclosure of contributions to candidates and political parties will deter some individuals who otherwise might contribute." Ante, at 68. Examples come readily to mind. Rank-and-file union members or rising junior executives may now think twice before making even modest contributions to a candidate who is disfavored by the union or management hierarchy. Similarly, potential contributors may well decline to take the obvious risks entailed in making a reportable contribution to the opponent of a well-entrenched incumbent. This fact of political life did not go unnoticed by the Congress: "The disclosure provisions really have in fact made it difficult for challengers to challenge incumbents." 120 Cong. Rec. 34392 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Long). See Pollardv. Roberts, 283 F. Supp. 248 (ED Ark.), aff'd per curiam, 393 U. S. 14 (1968). The public right to know ought not be absolute when its exercise reveals private political convictions. Secrecy, like privacy, is not per se criminal. On the contrary, secrecy and privacy as to political preferences and convictions are fundamental in a free society. For example, one of the great political reforms was the advent of the secret ballot as a universal practice. Similarly, the enlightened labor legislation of our time has enshrined the secrecy of choice of a bargaining representative for