BUCKLEY v. VALEO 1 Opinion of BURGER, C. J. or the separation of civilian and military authority, see Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83, 93-94 (1953), neither of which is explicit in the Constitution but both of which have developed through case-by-case adjudication of express provisions of the Constitution. Recent history shows dangerous examples of systems with a close, "incestuous" relationship between "government" and "politics"; the Court's opinion simply dismisses possible dangers by noting that: "Subtitle H is a congressional effort, not to abridge, restrict, or censor speech, but rather to use public money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and participation in the electoral process, goals vital to a self-governing people." Ante, at 92-93. Congress, it reassuringly adds by way of a footnote, has expressed its determination to avoid such a possibility. 5 Ante, at 93 n. 126. But the Court points to no basis for predicting that the historical pattern of "varying measures of control and surveillance," Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 621, which usually accompany grants from Government will not also follow in this case. 6 Up to now, the Court has always been extraordinarily sensitive, when dealing with First Amendment rights, to the risk that the "flag tends to follow the dollars." Yet, here, where Subtitle H specifically requires the auditing of records of political parties and candidates by Government inspectors," the Court shows '- Such considerations have never before influenced the Court's evaluation of the risks of restraints on expression. 16 The Court's opinion demonstrates one such intrusion. While the Court finds that the Act's expenditure limitations unconstitutionally inhibit a candidate's or a party's First Amendment rights, it imposes, by invoking the severability clause of Subtitle H, such limitations on qualifying for public funds. 17 See, e. g., 26 U. S. C. §§ 9003, 9007, 9033, 9038 (1970 ed., Supp. IV).