BUCKLEY v. VALEO 1 Opinion of BURGER, C. J. nary candidate are severely restricted in amount-and small contributors are deterred. I cannot believe that Congress would have enacted a statutory scheme containing such incongruous and inequitable provisions. Although the statute contains a severability clause, 2 U. S. C. § 454 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), such a clause is not an "inexorable command." 21 Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286, 290 (1924). The clause creates a rebuttable presumption that " 'eliminating invalid parts, the legislature would have been satisfied with what remained.'" Welsh v. United States, 398 U. S. 333, 364 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring, quoting from Champlin Rfg. Co. v. Commission, 286 U. S. 210, 235 (1932)). Here just as the presumption of constitutionality of a statute has been overcome to the point that major proportions and chapters of the Act have been declared unconstitutional, for me the presumption of severability has been rebutted. To invoke a severability clause to salvage parts of a comprehensive, integrated statutory scheme, which parts, standing alone, are unworkable and in many aspects unfair, exalts a formula at the expense of the broad objectives of Congress. Finally, I agree with the Court that the members of the Federal Election Commission were unconstitutionally appointed. However, I disagree that we should give blanket de facto validation to all actions of the Commission undertaken until today. The issue is not before us and we cannot know what acts we are ratifying. I would leave this issue to the District Court to resolve if and when any challenges are brought. In the past two decades the Court has frequently 21 Section 454 provides that if a "provision" is invalid, the entire Act will not be deemed invalid. More than a provision, more than a few provisions, have been held invalid today. Section 454 probably does not even reach such extensive invalidation.