OCTOBER TERM, 1975
Opinion of WHITE, J.
424 U. S.
independent expenditures is essential to prevent transparent and widespread evasion of the contribution limits.
In sustaining the contribution limits, the Court recognizes the importance of avoiding public misapprehension
about a candidate's reliance on large contributions. It
ignores that consideration in invalidating § 608 (e). In
like fashion, it says that Congress was entitled to determine that the criminal provisions against bribery and
corruption, together with the disclosure provisions, would
not in themselves be adequate to combat the evil and
that limits on contributions should be provided. Here,
the Court rejects the identical kind of judgment made
by Congress as to the need for and utility of expenditure
limits. I would not do so.
The Court also rejects Congress' judgment manifested
in § 608 (c) that the federal interest in limiting total
campaign expenditures by individual candidates justifies the incidental effect on their opportunity for
effective political speech. I disagree both with the
Court's assessment of the impact on speech and with its
narrow view of the values the limitations will serve.
Proceeding from the maxim that "money talks," the
Court finds that the expenditure limitations will seriously
curtail political expression by candidates and interfere
substantially with their chances for election. The Court
concludes that the Constitution denies Congress the
power to limit campaign expenses; federal candidatesand I would suppose state candidates, too-are to have
the constitutional right to raise and spend unlimited
amounts of money in quest of their own election.
As an initial matter, the argument that money is
speech and that limiting the flow of money to the speaker
violates the First Amendment proves entirely too much.
Compulsory bargaining and the right to strike, both
provided for or protected by federal law, inevitably have
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